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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE
IN NEW YORK CITY: SPARING THE CHILD
OR SPOILING THE FAMILY?
Alison B. Vreeland*
INTRODUCTION
Recently, in New York City, increasing numbers of parents have
been charged with "[e]ndangering the welfare of a child"' and
prosecuted in criminal court for acts of child neglect that were tra-
ditionally handled through child protective services and the family
court. Historically, the police have arrested and prosecuted par-
ents and custodians for child abuse, including sexual abuse. But in
cases of suspected neglect, the Administration for Children's Serv-
ices ("ACS")2 would respond to complaints of child neglect re-
ported to the State Central Registry.3 The police are acting under
a directive by New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir
to "take action . . . when [they] see children in dangerous situa-
tions."4 Opponents assert that this recent trend in criminal prose-
cutions is an expansion of the "mandatory arrest policy" used in
cases of domestic violence.5
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University, 2000; B.A., Middlebury College, 1995.
Associate Notes and Articles Editor, Fordham Urban Law Journal. This Note is dedi-
cated to my parents for all of their love and support, and their inspiring vision of
family. I would like to thank the attorneys at Lansner & Kubitschek, who first intro-
duced me to this exciting topic. I am forever indebted to Professor Ann Moynihan
for her mentoring and thoughtful advising on this project.
1. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1998).
2. ACS is the child welfare agency for the City of New York. In the past, ACS
has also been known as the Bureau of Child Welfare and the Child Welfare Agency.
See ACS, Protecting the Children of New York: A Plan of Action for the Administra-
tion for Children's Services (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/htm/acs/
html/frames1.html>.
3. The State Central Registry is the intake center in Albany that receives reports
and complaints from all over the state and refers the cases to local agencies to investi-
gate. All complaints are accepted if the allegations could constitute maltreatment.
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(2)(a) (McKinney 1992).
4. Joanne Wasserman, More Kids Left Alone, State Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July
27, 1997, at 4.
5. In 1994, the New York State Legislature amended section 140.10 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law to address the failure of police to arrest an offending
party in cases of domestic violence unless the victim chooses to press charges. See
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c) (McKinney 1998). The new mandatory arrest
policy requires police to arrest the offending party, rather than the previous practice
of having them take a walk to cool off. See id.
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There is a growing debate over this criminalization of child wel-
fare. Increasing numbers of arrests for child endangerment indi-
cate that the police are more inclined to automatically arrest
parents suspected of neglect.6 Often the perpetrators arrested are
parents who, because of poverty or poor judgment, have commit-
ted comparatively minor offenses such as leaving children un-
supervised, at home or on the street.7 The debate over the police
policy centers on whether or not arrest and criminal prosecution
are the most appropriate responses to child neglect.
This new policy is, in part, a response to tragic, high-profiled
child abuse cases where a child reported to the child welfare system
died at the hands of her parents.8 In an effort to avoid other un-
necessary deaths, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has reinstated the long-
abandoned practice of using police power to arrest and prosecute
parents when there is probable cause to believe a parent has en-
dangered the welfare of a child.9 As a result, the criminal court
system is confronting more and more of these cases. 10
The criminalization of child welfare law is having a dramatic ef-
fect on the rights of children within the family. This Note ad-
dresses the debate over whether increased police involvement in,
and criminal prosecution of, acts of child neglect adequately pre-
serves the rights of the child. Part I discusses the criminalization
trend and the fundamental differences between how the family
court and the criminal court handle neglect. Part II presents the
6. In 1990, there were 303 total arrests for the primary charge of "Endangering
the Welfare of a Child." In 1998, there were 1111. See app. infra, tbl.5.
7. See Rachel L. Swarns, In a Policy Shift, More Parents Are Arrested for Child
Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, at Al (discussing instances where mothers who
had left their children unattended were arrested for child endangerment).
8. See Martin G. Karopkin, Child Abuse and Neglect: New Role for Criminal
Court, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1996, at 1 (discussing how "[a] few highly publicized events
have worked to change" the approach to child neglect that preferred the family court
over the criminal court). One such case was that of Elisa Isquierdo. In November
1995, six-year-old Elisa died at the hands of her crack-addicted mother after months
of abuse and torture. Despite countless reports by the child's teachers, neighbors and
friends, New York City child welfare workers failed to remove the child from her
mother. See Mona Charen, With Kids, the Cautious Seldom Err, DENV. ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 22, 1997, at 67A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See Karopkin, supra note 8. Judge Karopkin asserts that a few highly publi-
cized incidents of child abuse have led to fundamental changes in the way child wel-
fare cases are handled by police and prosecutors. See id. "These changes have
brought a steady stream of criminal cases where the injuries are less severe or where
there is no injury and the charges involve allegations of neglect." Id. Statistics sup-
port Judge Karopkin's observation. Arrests for the criminal charge of "endangering
the welfare of a child" have more than tripled since 1990. See app. infra, tbl.5.
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arguments for and against increased police involvement and crimi-
nal prosecution of neglectful parents. It examines the child's lib-
erty interest in the parent-child relationship, a right that is
implicated when a child is removed from her parents. Part II fur-
ther compares how this constitutional right is affected in family
court neglect proceedings and in criminal court child endanger-
ment prosecutions. Part III argues that the criminalization of child
welfare does not reflect the status that children have achieved as
rights-bearers,11 in that the child has no voice and no right to self-
determination in the parent's prosecution. Part III furthers argues
that this criminalization trend poses a threat to any interest of the
child that is independent of that of the State and that of the parent.
The child's rights are presumed protected by either the parent or
the State, although her true interests often do not fully align with
either, leaving her voiceless in child endangerment prosecutions.
This Note concludes that the criminal justice system, by focusing
on the parent's claims against the State and the State's interest in
child protection, is inadequate in accommodating the constitutional
rights of the child to self-determination. Therefore, child neglect is
best adjudicated in family court under the New York Family Court
Act ("FCA"), which provides the child with legal representation
and thereby protects the child's right to self-determination as well
as her liberty interest in the parent-child relationship.
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION TREND
A. How Neglect Cases Are Handled Through Child Protective
Services and the Family Court
While child abuse and neglect have existed throughout history, 2
it has only been in the last fifty years that public awareness of this
problem has grown,' 3 prompting State intervention on behalf of
11. The term "rights-bearer" refers to individuals who have a set of rights under
natural, common or statutory law. See, e.g., Eric J. Mitnick, Taking Rights Spherically:
Formal and Collective Aspects of Legal Rights, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 409, 426
(1999) (describing how "the provision of rights to individuals necessarily animates the
generation of classes of rights-bearers"); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 48 (1991) (discussing the "image of the
rights-bearer as a self-determining unencumbered individual . . ").
12. See generally Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical
Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1972) (discuss-
ing child maltreatment throughout history).
13. See Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need
to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539 (1985).
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children. 4 Today every state has established child protective serv-
ices agencies to receive reports of abuse and neglect.15
In New York, the Child Protective Services Act of 197316 regu-
lates the provision of protective services to abused and maltreated
children. 7 In 1998, 57,842 cases of child abuse and neglect were
reported in New York State. 18 These cases come to the state's at-
tention through the New York State Telephone Hotline ("Hot-
line"). These reports are received by the Statewide Central
Registry of Child Abuse and Maltreatment ("State Central Regis-
try"). 19 Anyone can call in a report to the Hotline. The caller must
simply have "reasonable cause" to make a report of suspected
child abuse or maltreatment.2 °
Under New York law, certain individuals are mandated to report
any suspicion of child abuse or neglect. 21 These "mandated report-
ers" include school officials, physicians and police officers.22 Once
a report is received, a state worker at the State Central Registry
makes a preliminary determination of the validity of the allega-
tions.23 If it is determined that the allegations received by the Hot-
line constitute a report of abuse or maltreatment, the state
becomes obligated to report the matter to a local agency.24
The standard for determining the validity of an allegation is
whether the allegation "could reasonably constitute a report of
14. See Jill D. Moore, Charting a Course between Scylla and Charybdis: Child
Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 2064 (1995).
15. See id. at 2070-78.
16. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999).
17. See id.
18. See app. infra, tbl.1.
19. The term "maltreatment" is broader than "neglect" as defined in section 1012
of the FCA because it covers children in foster care and state run institutions. See
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 412(2).
20. See id. § 414.
21. See id. § 413(1). Section 413(1) of the New York Social Services Law provides
that mandated reporters must:
report or cause a report to be made in accordance with this title when they
have reasonable cause to suspect that a child coming before them in their
professional or official capacity is an abused or maltreated child, or when
they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child is an abused or maltreated
child where the parent, guardian, custodian or other person legally responsi-
ble for such child comes before them in their professional or official capacity
and states from personal knowledge facts, conditions or circumstances
which, if correct, would render the child an abused or maltreated child ....
Id.
22. See id. (containing an exhaustive list of mandated reporters).
23. See id. § 422(2)(a).
24. See Boland v. State, 638 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502-03 (App. Div. 1996).
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child abuse or maltreatment. ' 25 If this standard is met, the case is
then referred to local child protection agencies.26 In New York
City, the borough offices of ACS receive these reports.27 Within
twenty-four hours of receiving a report, ACS must commence an
investigation.28 This investigation includes conducting a home visit
with the family, evaluating the environment of the child named in
the report and any other children living there, assessing the risk to
the children, as well as determining the nature, extent and cause of
any condition enumerated in the report.2 9 The caseworker typi-
cally interviews the child or children, determines their names and
ages and evaluates their condition.30 The case worker must then
"forthwith notify the subjects of the report and other persons
named in the report in writing of the existence of the report and
their respective rights .... "31 Part of the decision-making process
includes deciding whether the facts alleged are sufficient to estab-
lish neglect.32
Under existing guidelines, ACS must make a preliminary report
within seven days.33 ACS must complete its investigation and de-
termine whether the report is "indicated" or "unfounded" within
sixty days.34 An "indicated" report means that some credible evi-
dence of maltreatment exists, whereas an "unfounded" report
means there is no credible evidence to support it.35 On average,
the number of indicated reports is less than half of the number of
total reports.36 When a report of suspected child neglect is indi-
cated by ACS, the Agency assesses what, if any, preventive services
might be put in place for the family.37 Before a petition is filed
against the parent in family court, ACS must have conducted an
25. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(2)(a).
26. See id. § 422(2)(b).
27. See id.




32. See id. § 422(2)(b).
33. See id. § 424(3).
34. Id. § 424(7).
35. See id. § 412(11), (12).
36. For example, in 1997, 40% of all mandated reports were indicated. See app.
infra, tbl.3.
37. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(iii) ("[Tihe state's first obligation is to
help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child has
already left home.").
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investigation, assessed the threat to the child and attempted to pro-
vide the family with assistance.38
If the Agency determines that the child faces imminent risk, a
neglect petition can be filed in family court or the child may be
removed under emergency conditions. 39 Article 10 petitions are
filed in only a fraction of the total cases.40 When a child is removed
under emergency conditions, the child is taken into the protective
custody of the Commissioner of the Administration for Children's
Services, and ACS must file a petition in family court.4" The par-
ents would then be served with a summons and a copy of the peti-
tion containing the allegations against them.42 Under these
circumstances, the parent is entitled to an immediate hearing to be
held within three days at which the court will assess if there is im-
minent risk to the child.43
The court later holds a "fact-finding hearing" to decide whether
the child has been abused or neglected. 4 At this hearing, ACS
may present evidence and witness testimony in support of the alle-
gations in the petition.45 If the court finds that the allegations have
not been proven, the petition is dismissed and the child is returned
home.46 If the court "makes a finding," that is, finds that the alle-
gations are true and that the child has been abused or neglected, a
dispositional hearing is held to determine what is in the best inter-
38. The assessment of conduct employs the standard established by the FCA and
requires the following inquiry: does the parent fail to exercise "a minimum degree of
care" so that the child's physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or
is in imminent danger of being impaired? N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney
1999).
39. ACS may remove the child from the home prior to filing the petition if the
child is in "imminent danger." Id. § 1024.
40. In 1998, 57,842 abuse and neglect reports came in, but only 11,000 petitions
were filed. See app. infra, tbls.1, 4.
41. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(10).
42. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1036.
43. "Imminent risk" is the statutory language and standard by which the family
court judge is to assess the removal of a child. See id. § 1027(b)(i). Under section
1027(a) of the FCA, when a child has been removed without a court order, a hearing
must be held to determine if the child should remain in the custody of ACS pending
the fact-finding trial. If the court finds that removal is necessary to avoid imminent
risk to the child's life or health, the court should continue the removal. See id.
§ 1027(b)(i). The respondent parent can then apply for the return of the child. See id.
§ 1028(a). The court shall grant the application unless it finds the return presents an
imminent risk to the child's life or health. See id. § 1027(b)(i).
44. Id. § 1044.
45. See id. § 1046.
46. See id. § 1051.
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ests of the child.47 If the child has not already been removed from
the home before the fact-finding, once a finding has been made,
the court can remove the child from the home and "remand" her to
the custody of ACS.48 Following a finding, the court will order an
investigation of the child's home and family by ACS.4 9 The court
will hear the results of this investigation at the dispositional hear-
ing and make a determination about the child's disposition based
on the child's best interests.5 0 Possible dispositions may include re-
turning the child to the home on certain conditions or placing the
child in foster care 1 while services are provided to the parents.5 2
This traditional approach to child neglect has recently changed in
New York City.
B. Current Police Policy and the Trend Towards Criminalization
Prior to 1977, New York family courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over acts between family members that would constitute crimes if
they were between strangers.5 3 In 1977, the New York Legislature
amended the Criminal Procedure Law to give the criminal court
concurrent original jurisdiction over these acts. 4 Once a case was
brought in one of these two courts, the complainant had three days
in which to decide whether to transfer the case to the other court.55
47. Id. §§ 1047(a), 1052. Judge Cardozo first enunciated the "best interests of the
child" standard. See Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interests Of the Child: By Whose Defini-
tion?, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 383, 384 n.75 (1991) (citing LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins
and Evolution of the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459,
467 (1989)). While the standard is not clearly defined, it typically requires an exami-
nation of factors relating to a child's safety, happiness and physical, mental and moral
welfare. See id. at 384 (citing Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A.2d 593, 598 (N.J. 1956)).
48. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AC § 1052(a)(3).
49. See id. § 1034 (authorizing the family court judge to order the child protective
agency to conduct a child protective investigation in any proceeding under Article
10).
50. See id. § 623 ("'[A] dispositional hearing' means a hearing to determine what
order of disposition should be made in accordance with the best interest of the
child.").
51. A child may be placed in foster care for a period of up to one year. This
placement can be extended if a petition is filed by the foster care agency, and a hear-
ing is held in which the court decides whether or not continued placement is neces-
sary. See id. § 1055.
52. See id. § 1057; see also COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, ASS'N B.
N.Y.C., INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT 27-30
(1997).
53. Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, As Complainant Chooses Family Court;
People v. Damon McCoy, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1998, at 25.
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The case could not be heard by both courts simultaneously.5 6 If the
complainant chose to transfer the case to family court, the district
attorney could not prosecute." However, this policy was not well-
received, and in 1994, the Family Protection and Domestic Vio-
lence Intervention Act was passed.5 1 This Act provided that inci-
dents involving disorderly conduct, harassment (first and second
degree), aggravated harassment in the second degree, menacing
(second and third degree), reckless endangerment, attempted as-
sault and assault (second and third degree) between family mem-
bers could not be prosecuted in both courts simultaneously.59 The
stated purpose of this amendment was "to give greater protection
and choice to the victims of domestic abuse, not less."6° The
amendment did mark a new development in domestic violence law
by enabling the district attorney to pursue a criminal case even
over the direct wishes of- the complainant that the matter be
brought in family court.6'
In 1994, the New York State Legislature amended the Criminal
Procedure Law to address the common police practice of failing to
arrest the offending party in cases of domestic violence.62 The new
policy is referred to as a "mandatory arrest" policy, which requires
the police to arrest an offending party rather than permit him to
"COO1 off."16 3 The new policy is intended to provide endangered wo-
men with a reliable source of assistance.64 The police no longer
may ask the complainant whether she wishes to press charges in
order to execute an arrest.65
56. See id.
57. See People v. Fisher, 580 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Justice Ct. 1991); People v. Falzone,
537 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Crim. Ct. 1989).
58. See 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 222.
59. See Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 25.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(a) (McKinney 1999) (mandating police
officers to arrest, not attempt to reconcile the parties or mediate, where an officer has
reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed by one family member
against another).
63. Section 140.10(4)(c) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that
where an officer has reasonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor constituting a
family offense has occurred, the officer shall arrest the offender, and "shall not at-
tempt to reconcile the parties or mediate...." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c).
64. See JILL M. ZUCCARDY, BROOKLYN B. ASS'N VOLUNTEER LAW. PROJECT,
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION AND ORDERS OF PROTECTION: CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND
FAMILY COURT (1997).
65. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c).
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In the last two to three years, the New York Police Department
has played a more active role in child welfare. As a result, more
and more parents are being arrested and charged with the misde-
meanor crime of "endangering the welfare of a child" for acts that
constitute child neglect.66 This Note addresses only the arrest and
criminal prosecution of parents for acts of neglect that do not in-
clude abuse or excessive corporal punishment. The offending be-
havior in many child endangerment cases includes, for example,
leaving a child alone, failing to ensure school attendance or poor
house-keeping. 67 There is a growing sentiment that the police have
actually expanded the "must arrest" policy used in domestic vio-
lence cases to child welfare matters as well.68 Regardless of
whether this sentiment is true, the criminal court system has seen
more cases of child neglect in recent years than it has in the past.69
Statistics show that while arrests for acts constituting criminal child
endangerment have nearly tripled in the last eight years, the
number of petitions filed in family court for neglect have not simi-
larly increased but have instead decreased. 70 This outcome may
indicate that the increased number of arrests are not due to in-
creased neglectful behavior, but rather increased enforcement of
the criminal statute and police arrests.
In People v. Smith,71 a mother of four was arrested in her home
and charged with "endangering the welfare of a child" for leaving
her four children, ages five, seven, twelve and thirteen, home alone
for two hours.72 In the decision, the judge noted that "there are an
increasing number of these so called 'home alone cases' appearing
66. See app. infra, tbl.5. The number of arrests where "endangering the welfare of
a child" was the primary charge has nearly quadrupled since 1990. See id.
67. See infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
68. In her testimony before the New York State Assembly on December 16, 1997,
Jill Zuccardy argued against "the New York Police Department policy of using 'must
arrest' as a justification for acting independently of ACS in cases of alleged child
neglect ...." Public Hearing, infra note 134.
69. See Karopkin, supra note 8. In his article, Judge Karopkin discusses how the
Criminal Court generally only saw severe cases involving child or sexual abuse, but
that this practice has changed because a few highly publicized cases of abuse have
brought attention to the issue. See id. Now the Criminal Court sees more cases
where the injuries are less severe, or the allegations are of neglect alone. See id.
70. See app. infra, tbls.4, 5.
71. 678 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Crim. Ct. 1998).
72. See id. at 873. The police found the children home alone when they went to
the house in response to a 911 call placed by an unidentified caller. The defendant
was arrested and held overnight in jail. See id. at 874. At the arraignment, the judge
refused the people's request for an order of protection for the children, and the de-
fendant was released on her own recognizance. See id. The court granted the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendant's action failed to make out
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in Criminal Court which are charged under section one of Penal
Law 260.10, which provides no such guidance."73 This trend is sig-
nificant because it shows that the police may now be making ar-
rests for poor decision-making or lack of resources among parents.
Unlike the defendant in Smith, Laura Vanegas was arrested and
jailed overnight in July of 1997 when the police found her two sons
alone outside of their aunt's apartment in East Harlem.74 The chil-
dren were placed in foster care, but the charge of child endanger-
ment was later dropped.75
In 1997 and 1998, there was much discussion in the press about
increasing numbers of arrests in New York City for acts of ne-
glect.7 6 This attention sparked criticism of the new police policy. 77
The criticism was that the circumstances did not seem egregious
enough to warrant arrest.78 In 1997, Sourette Alwysh, a thirty-
four-year-old mother, was arrested for living with her five-year-old
son in a roach-infested apartment without electricity or running
water.79 Ms. Alwysh, a Haitian immigrant, had been living in a
foreclosed building.80 When the police discovered this fact they
took her away in handcuffs and placed her son in foster care.8' In
1997, Sidelina Zuniga, thirty-nine, was arrested for leaving her two
any cognizable crime under section 260.10(2) of the New York Penal Law. See id. at
875.
73. Id.
74. See Rachel L. Swarns, In a Policy Shift, More Parents Are Arrested for Child
Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, at Al.
75. See id.
76. See id.; Joanne Wasserman, More Kids Left Alone, State Says, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, July 27, 1997, at 4; Bill Egbert & Henri E. Cauvin, Charged Mom Left Six Kids
at Home, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 1998, at 6; John Schultz, Mom Charged in Child
Abandonment, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 16, 1998, at A20; Timothy D. May, Boy Found in
Park to Live with Dad; Agency Probing Paterson Mom, RECORD, July 15, 1997, at
L01; Graham Rayman, Mom Charged in Child Neglect, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 17,
1998, at A20; Associated Press, Teen Mother Arrested After Leaving Infants Alone,
BuFF. NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 6A; Henri E. Cauvin, B-lyn Mom Busted in Home-
Alone Case, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1998, at 16; Cerisse Anderson, Leaving Chil-
dren in Auto May Be Prosecuted as Crime, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 24, 1998, at 1; Associated
Press, 2 Sons Alone; Mom Arrested, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 2, 1997, at A52; Mirta Ojito,
Mother's Neglect Arrest Called No Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at B3.
77. See, e.g., Ilze Betins, Letter to the Editor, Child Welfare Doesn't Belong in
Police Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A30; Brian Harmom & Lama Bakri,
Mom's Arrest Sets Off Debate on Child Neglect, DET. NEWS, May 15, 1997, at Cl;
Katha Pollitt, Killer Moms, Working Nannies; an Increase in Arrests of Mothers
Charged with Child Neglect, Some on Ridiculous Charges, Highlights the Need for
Working Mothers to Stand Up for Their Rights, NATION, Nov. 24, 1997, at 9.
78. See Pollitt, supra note 77.
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sons, ages ten and four, at home for an hour and a half while she
shopped at a grocery store.82 In September of 1997, Lucia Savarin,
forty-one, was arrested for losing sight of her four-year-old son,
who wandered outside into the night while his mother helped a
friend move into a new apartment.83 Ms. Savarin had trusted a
friend to watch her son, but somehow the boy was unattended long
enough to make it outside.84 Samantha Stevens, thirty-three, was
charged with six counts of child endangerment in August of 1998
when she left her six children home alone for five hours.85 The
children ranged in age from five-months to eleven-years-old.86
They were discovered after the three-year-old slipped outside and
was found on the street.8 7
Until recent years, mothers who had committed similar acts of
child neglect would have been referred to ACS, where they would
have received counseling and services, but probably not have been
arrested.88 In fact, "[b]efore the change in policy, police officers
who found children briefly left home alone or living in substandard
housing would call child welfare workers, who would arrange for
counseling, day care, housing subsidies or, in extreme cases, place
the children in foster care. The parents were rarely arrested."89
Typically, after social services had been notified, the family would
have been monitored by social workers. 90
Statistics have indicated that the New York Police Department is
more likely to make an arrest in cases of child neglect than in prior
years.9' By 1998, the number of arrests for child endangerment
had more than tripled since 1990.92 The rise in arrests has been
attributed to Police Commissioner Howard Safir's directive to the
police to "take action ... when [they] see children in dangerous
situations. ' ' 93 While child advocates promote dealing with child ne-




85. See Rayman, supra note 76.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Swarns, supra note 74.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See app. infra, tbl.5.
92. See id.
93. Wasserman, supra note 76 (quoting New York City Police Commissioner How-
ard Safir).
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he would prefer that cops be aggressive.94 "Quite honestly, I
would much rather be accused of overreaction than underreac-
tion," he stated in 1997. 9' This new police initiative has led to a
sixty percent increase in misdemeanor arrests for endangering chil-
dren since 1995.96
The practices used by the police when investigating suspected
child neglect can differ substantially from those of ACS. The police
receive their policy dictates from sources including the Police Stu-
dent's Guide,97 a training manual, and the Police Patrol Guide,98 a
practice manual. Under the Police Student's Guide, when an of-
ficer responds to a domestic incident, the investigation includes de-
termining if there are any children present who may be victims of
neglect, abuse or maltreatment. 99 If the officer "reasonably sus-
pects" a child of being abused, neglected or maltreated, they first
must prepare a Report of Suspected Child Abuse or Maltreat-
ment °° and notify the State Central Registry. 10 1 If the police feel
that there is probable cause to believe the crime of endangering the
welfare of a child has been committed, the parent is arrested and
removed from the home.10 2 The Student Guide defines "probable
cause" as "[a] combination of facts, viewed through the eyes of a
police officer, which would lead a person of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense is being or has been committed."'' 0 3 After
the arresting officer has called the State Central Registry, the nor-
mal procedure is presumably followed and the case is investigated
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See Swarns, supra note 74.
97. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., POLICE STUDENT'S GUIDE (on file with the author).
98. See id.
99. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No. 110-38: FAMILY OF-
FENSES/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2 (1989) (on file with the author).
100. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No. 106-15: EMERGENCY
REMOVALS OR INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING OF ABUSED, NEGLECTED OR MAL-
TREATED CHILDREN 5 (1989) (on file with the author).
101. See supra note 3 (State Central Registry); see also supra note 21 (mandated
reporters).
102. See supra note 100, at 3.
103. POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., POLICE STUDENT'S GUIDE, INTERIM ORDER No. 10, at
25 (1995) (on file with the author). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that probable
cause for an arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting of-
ficers' knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are suf-
ficient in themselves to convince a man of reasonable caution that an offense has been
or is being committed. The evidence need not be sufficient to establish guilt, although
the officer's mere suspicion or good faith belief is not enough to constitute probable
cause. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963).
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within twenty-four hours.104 The Police Student's Guide is silent
regarding what is to be done with the child for those twenty-four
hours.
The Patrol Guide authorizes the emergency removal of children
deemed to be abused, neglected or maltreated.' 1 5 The definitions
of "neglect" and "abuse" are taken from the FCA.10 6 Under this
Patrol Guide procedure, an officer who has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the child's continued presence within the home presents
an imminent danger to the child's life or health has the authority to
remove the child after requesting the response of a patrol supervi-
sor.107 The child is then taken to the station house or to the hospi-
tal if deemed necessary. 108 The arresting officer then refers the
child to ACS and reports the case to the State Central Registry. 0 9
Under New York Criminal Procedure Law, when a criminal ac-
tion involving a complaint charging any crime or violation between
spouses, former spouses, parent and child, or between members of
the same family or household is pending, the court may issue a
temporary order of protection. 110 The court may issue this order
ex parte upon the filing of an accusatory instrument and for good
cause shown.' The defendant is entitled to an opportunity to be
heard only if recognizance or bail is involved. 2 It is common
practice in criminal prosecutions for the prosecutor to request the
court to issue such an order of protection barring the parent from
contact with the child." 3 There is no provision in the criminal stat-
utes that give the defendant an opportunity to be heard where an
order of protection has been requested." 4 The order of protection
prevents the parent from contacting the child, but the parent still
104. See supra Part I.A.
105. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE PROC. No. 106-15, supra note 100,
at 1.
106. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e), (f) (McKinney 1999).
107. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE PROC. No. 106-15, supra note 100,
at 2.
108. See id. at 3.
109. See id. at 3, 5.
110. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1) (McKinney 1999).
111. See id. § 530.12(3).
112. See id. § 510.20.
113. See Jane Golden, Is Social Work Losing Child Welfare?, CUSSW CENTENNIAL
CELEBRATION, June 12, 1998.
114. A defendant is only entitled to an opportunity to be heard if recognizance or
bail is involved. Otherwise, the criminal court can issue a temporary order of protec-
tion ex parte. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 510.20, 530.12(3).
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retains legal custody." 5 It is necessary for the arresting officer to
have contacted ACS and initiated child protective custody, or else
the child remains in limbo, without a custodian. The criminal court
system has no legal mechanism to provide for the child while the
parent is detained.1 6 It is necessary for ACS to file a petition in
family court for the child to be placed in foster care.' 17
C. FCA "Neglect" v. Penal Law "Child Endangerment"
The concepts of "abuse," "neglect" and "maltreatment" are by
no means universal. Article 10 of the FCA defines what behavior
by adults constitutes child abuse or neglect.'1 8 However, Article 10
child protective proceedings do not protect children against the be-
havior of all adults. Under the FCA, the child is protected from
the improper behavior of the child's custodian, guardian or any
other person legally responsible for the child's care at the time.119
A "person legally responsible" can include any adult who is living
in the household and has regular contact with the child. 20 This
definition may include a relative or paramour living within the
home.' 2 '
Under section 1012 of the FCA, a child is a neglected child if the
caretaker fails to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing
for specified basic needs of the child, with the result that the child's
physical, mental or emotional condition is impaired or in danger of
115. Under section 530.12 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, "when a
criminal action is pending involving a complaint charging any crime or violation be-
tween ... parent and child. .. the court... may issue a temporary order of protection
...." Id. § 530.12(1).
116. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374 (McKinney 1999). While section 1024 of the
FCA provides that:
a peace officer. . ., police officer, or law enforcement official, or an agent of
a duly incorporated society for the prevention of cruelty to children or a
designated employee of a city or county department of social services shall
take all necessary measures to protect a child's life or health including...
taking or keeping a child in protective custody," only an authorized agency
may place a child in foster care.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1024(a) (McKinney 1999).
117. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Ac-r § 1026.
118. See id. § 1012(e), (f).
119. See id. § 1012(g).
120. See, e.g., In re Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1.996) (holding that the uncle
of the subject children was a person legally responsible where the subject child visited
him every other week during the time in question and the uncle was regularly present
at the child's own house); In re Heather U., 632 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1995) (hold-
ing that the mother's live-in paramour was a person legally responsible for the subject
child in that he had been living in the home for three years).
121. See In re Heather U., 632 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
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impairment; or if the child is abandoned by the caretaker. While
the statute does not set thorough guidance for the care of a child, it
sets a bare minimum standard to be met by the caretaker. The
child must be provided with adequate food, clothing, shelter, edu-
cation and medical care.123 The statute requires that a causal con-
nection be established between the lack of care and the
impairment of the child.1 24 An important element of the FCA defi-
nition of neglect is that it takes into account the financial ability of
the parent to provide for the child. 125 A failure to provide a child
with basic care can only be found after a determination that the
parent is "financially able to do so or [has been] offered financial
or other reasonable means to do so .. .126
New York Penal Law criminalizes behavior that endangers the
welfare of a child.1 27 A person is guilty of child endangerment
when he knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the
physical, mental or moral welfare of a child under the age of seven-
teen.2 8 Violation of the statute also occurs when a parent, guard-
ian or other person legally charged with the care or custody of a
child under eighteen fails or refuses to exercise reasonable dili-
gence in the control of such child to prevent him from becoming
an "abused child," a "neglected child," a "juvenile delinquent"
or a "person in need of supervision," under Articles 10, 3 and 7
of the FCA.129  Child endangerment can encompass a broad
range of acts. 130  In fact, under the statute, no actual harm
need result; rather, the course or conduct alleged must be likely
to be injurious. 131 Despite the breadth of conduct the statute
122. N.Y. FAM. CT. Ac'r § 1012(f).
123. See id. § 1012(f)(i)(A).
124. A preponderance of the evidence must show parental failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care, impairment or imminent danger of impairment to the child
and a causal connection between the two. See In re T. Children, 621 N.Y.S.2d 25
(App. Div. 1994).
125. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f)(i)(A).
126. Id.
127. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (McKinney 1999).
128. See id. The statute also criminalizes directing or authorizing a child to engage
in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his life or health. See id.
129. See id. § 260.10(2). Article 10 of the FCA governs child protective proceed-
ings; Article 3 governs juvenile delinquency; and Article 7 governs persons in need of
supervision.
130. See Karopkin, supra note 8.
131. See People v. Doe, 512 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (Crim. Ct. 1987) (stating that
although "the alleged conduct of the defendant did not involve physical contact with
the child [this] does not lead to the conclusion that such conduct was not 'likely to be
injurious to the ... mental or moral welfare' of the child" (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 260.10(1)).
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covers, challenges claiming unconstitutional vagueness have
failed.132
The penal law refers to the FCA for its definition of neglect.'133
Therefore, acts sufficient to establish neglect would also be suffi-
cient to establish child endangerment. As a result, the difference
lies not in the statutes, but rather in how the offending behavior is
prosecuted under each. The primary difference between how ne-
glect cases are handled in criminal court and how they are handled
in family court is a result of the nature of these two different
courts. 134 The family court is a rehabilitative setting that aims to
identify families in crisis, protect the parties in danger and provide
services to the family. 135 In addressing child abuse and neglect,
courts have struggled to accomplish several goals. In making dis-
positional orders, judges are bound to consider the child's best in-
terest first and foremost. 136 However, the preservation of families
also is a prominent goal in federal and New York State
legislation. 137
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 re-
quires states receiving federal foster care funds to make "reason-
132. See, e.g., People v. Padmore,. 634 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (App. Div. 1995).
133. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) ("[Ajn 'abused child,' a 'neglected child,' a
'juvenile delinquent' or a 'person in need of supervision,' as those terms are defined in
articles ten, three and seven of the FCA.").
134. "Criminal jurisdiction looks at the question what happened. Civil jurisdiction
looks at the question what is likely to happen in the future." Transcript, Examining
and Defining the Role of Law Enforcement in Child Welfare Matters: Public Hearing
on N.Y.S. Assembly Bill 7068 before N.Y.S. Assembly Standing Comm. on Children
and Families, 220th Legis., Dec. 16, 1997 [hereinafter "Public Hearing"] (statement by
Prof. Martin Guggenheim, N.Y.U. School of Law).
135. See People v. Roselle, 643 N.E.2d 72, 74 (N.Y. 1994) (noting that the family
court's duty was to protect the child and if possible work toward the future rehabilita-
tion of the family, whereas in criminal proceedings the state is primarily concerned
with the determination of the guilt of the accused).
136. The standard at a dispositional hearing is the child's best interests. See N.Y.
FAM. CT. Ac-r § 623 (McKinney 1999) ("'dispositional hearing' means a hearing to
determine what order of disposition should be made in accordance with the best inter-
ests of the child"); id. § 1052(b)(1)(A) (obligating judge in dispositional order to con-
sider whether continuation in the child's home would be contrary to the best interests
of the child); In re Anthony "00," 685 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (App. Div. 1999) ("It is...
well settled that unless all parties consent to dispense with such, a dispositional hear-
ing is required to determine the appropriate order of disposition to be entered upon
an adjudication of permanent neglect, and at the dispositional hearing the sole crite-
rion is the best interest of the child ...." (citations omitted)).
137. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b[1][a][iii] (McKinney 1998) ("[T]he state's
first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite
it if the child has already left home."); see also Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act of 1980, infra note 138 (requiring state agencies to make reasonable efforts to
keep families together).
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able efforts" to prevent a child from entering foster care and to
develop a case plan for each child in foster care that assures the
provision of services designed to facilitate the child's return to her
parents.a38 New York's compliance with this mandate is repre-
sented in the New York Social Services Law.1 39 New York case law
reflects a policy of preserving the parent-child relationship where
ever possible, while still acting in the child's best interest.1
40
In 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA"). 141 This federal act shifted the priority of the child wel-
fare system from family reunification to child protection.142  The
federal law clarifies that efforts at reunification are not required
where a child's health or safety would be endangered. 143 Under
the Act, if certain aggravating circumstances are present, social
workers no longer have to make a reasonable effort to preserve
families.144 The Act emphasizes expediting the procedure through
which a child is freed for adoption.1 45 Before ASFA, New York
law required officials to undertake "reasonable efforts" to reunify
foster children with their parents. 46 Once ASFA was passed, New
138. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (1980). In the 1970s, the foster care system was criticized because the
predominant approach to dealing with neglect and abuse was to separate the child
from the parent. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reap-
praisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975).
This approach was criticized for failing to consider that the child's emotional health
was at risk when the child was separated from her family. See id. In response to this
type of criticism, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act,
which made a priority of reuniting families whenever possible. See Kathleen A. Bai-
lie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in
Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2285, 2289 nn.38-40 and accompanying text (1998).
139. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b[1][a][iii] (requiring the state to provide fam-
ilies with services to prevent its break-up); see also id. § 131[3] ("As far as possible
families shall be kept together, they shall not be separated for reasons of poverty
alone, and they shall be provided services to maintain and strengthen family life.").
140. See In re Dickson, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363 (N.Y. 1981). "Consistent with the con-
stitutional protection of family integrity, Congress and the New York State Legisla-
ture have expressed a clear preference for the preservation of the family unit by
enacting laws to further this goal." Martin A. v. Gross, 524 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (Sup.
Ct. 1987). See also In re Sayeh R., 693 N.E.2d 724, 736 n.7 (N.Y. 1997).
141. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
142. See Bailie, supra note 138, at 2286 ("This federal legislation significantly
changed the goals of the child welfare system which, prior to this law, focused mainly
on reuniting families.").
143. See AFSA, supra note 141.
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (1999).
145. See id. 671(a)(15)(F).
146. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 409-a (McKinney 1999); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 423.4 (1999).
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York, along with other states, was required to pass its own imple-
menting legislation in order to receive federal funding.147 New
York stood to lose $450 million in funding if the legislation was not
enacted. 148 That legislation came in February of 1999, but not
before the New York Assembly missed three deadlines that Con-
gress had set.149 Disagreement among Democrats and Republicans
of the Assembly caused the delays. 5 ° Assembly Democrats feared
that the legislation would go too far in allowing for the termination
of parental rights. 1' The new law allows for the termination of
parental rights if a child has been in foster care for fifteen out of
the last twenty-two months.1 52 The state will also seek to terminate
parental rights if a parent abandons a newborn or assaults or kills a
child. 153
ASFA and New York State's implementing legislation has fed
the debate over what role family preservation should play in child
protection. This question is paramount to the issue of criminaliza-
tion because a shift toward child protection, and away from family
reunification, will embrace the increased role of law enforcement
in child welfare matters.
While this legislation made great strides for those who felt that
efforts at family preservation were hindering foster care children's
access to stable adoptive homes, the statute continues to require
that unless the aggravating circumstances are present, reasonable
efforts must be made to preserve and reunite families.' 54
In the last two decades, judges and social workers have placed a
priority on keeping families together. 55 The goal of family preser-
vation is evidenced by New York Social Services Law, under which
ACS is required to offer and provide services to prevent the break-
147. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637, 681-83 (1999)
(noting that Congress conditioned federal funding for states on compliance with the
federal legislation).
148. See Shannon McCaffrey, New York Dragging Its Feet on Meeting New Federal;
Child-Welfare Guidelines, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 19, 1999, at 3A.
149. See Lara Jakes, Funds to Follow Adoption Law Passage, TIMES UNION, Feb.
12, 1999, at B2.
150. See McCaffrey, supra note 148, at 3A.
151. See id.
152. See ASFA, supra note 141, at 2118 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)).
153. See id. at 2116-17. Where the child has been subjected to such aggravated
circumstances, reasonable reunification efforts are not required. See id.
154. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994).
155. See Lara Jakes, Saving Kids by Splitting Families, TIMES UNION, Aug. 23, 1998,
at Al.
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up of families. 156 Courts are left to strike a delicate balance be-
tween adequately protecting a child and fulfilling the obligation to
preserve families. The legislature has set out means to achieve this
balance by prescribing both preventive and protective services. 57
Since New York enacted the Child Welfare Reform Act in
1976,158 programs that provide "preventive services" have been
available to families in crisis. One of the purposes of the Act was
to provide "increased emphasis on preventive services designed to
maintain family relationships rather than responding to children
and families in trouble only by removing the child from the fam-
ily."'1 59 The services include counseling, therapy, drug and alcohol
abuse treatment, parenting skills training and homemaker ser-
vices.
60
The Department of Social Services' regulations in conjunction
with section 409 of the Social Services Law do not impose a nondis-
cretionary duty on social service officials to provide preventive
services in all cases.' 6 ' However, the statute indicates the prefer-
ence for family preservation whenever possible. 62 A child may not
be placed in foster care before preventive services have been pro-
vided to the family.' 63 However, if the services have been refused,
placement is ordered by the court, the child is at serious risk of
harm by the parent or the parents are unavailable, the child may be
immediately removed. 164
In addition to these statutory provisions that define the family
court as rehabilitative in nature, family court judges have authority
over ACS to ensure that the statutory mandates were followed.
165
The family court must inquire into what reasonable efforts were
made and what preventive services were offered prior to removal
156. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 409-a, 424 (McKinney 1999); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REOS. tit. 18, § 423.4 (1998).
157. See statutes cited supra note 136.
158. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 409 (McKinney 1992).
159. Governor's Memo, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1814.
160. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 423.2(b)(1)-(18) (1997). New
York State Department of Social Services regulations provide that the provision of
preventive services shall be considered mandatory where children are in foster care,
are at risk of placement in foster care, or are at risk of return to foster care. See id.
§ 430.9.
161. See Grant v. Cuomo, 518 N.Y.S.2d 105, 112 (App. Div. 1987).
162. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 409.
163. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, supra note 138.
164. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 430.10 (1999).
165. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr §§ 1022(a), 1027(b), 1028(b), 1052(b)(i) (McKinney
1999).
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of the child and at every stage of the proceedings by the agency. 66
The family court has the authority under the FCA to compel ACS
to conduct an investigation and report to the court.167 In family
court, ACS supervises the respondent parent and may impose con-
ditions upon that parent. 16 8 Moreover, ACS is a party to the case
and is required to appear and to comply with family court orders.
In contrast to the family court setting, the criminal court is a pu-
nitive setting, designed to punish individuals for unlawful acts, not
to mend families. 169 In the criminal adjudication, the state is the
prosecutor and the perpetrator is the defendant; the victim has lit-
tle or no involvement in determining the course the prosecution
takes. 7 ° There is no legislated requirement that reasonable efforts
be made to offer preventive services to the offender in the family
before criminal proceedings are initiated. 71 The criminal court has
no jurisdiction over ACS and cannot compel ACS to conduct an
investigation or oversee the family's progress. Often the district
attorney prosecuting the case has had no direct contact with the
child and knows little about the home situation.1 72 The effort that
ACS must make under the FCA and the Social Services Law to
preserve families whenever possible is not considered in criminal
adjudications, and is rather left to the domain of the concurrent, if
any, family court proceeding. 173
II. THE DEBATE OVER CRIMINALIZATION
The growing prevalence of child endangerment arrests has
spawned a debate that questions what is the most appropriate ap-
proach to child neglect. Historically, children enjoyed very little
166. See id.
167. See id. § 1034.
168. See id. § 1039.
169. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney 1998) (stating the purpose of the
penal provisions is to provide "an appropriate public response to particular offenses
.... .); see also Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, As Complainant Chose Family
Court; People v. Damon McCoy, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1998, at 25.
170. See Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, supra note 169.
171. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (stating "[a] criminal prosecution is punitive
and is not designed to heal or mend the family").
172. See Karopkin, supra note 8.
173. See People v. Pettiford, 516 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. 1987). A person can face a
civil proceeding under the FCA and criminal prosecution under New York Penal Law
for the same acts. This rule does not violate the double jeopardy clause because the
family court action is a civil proceeding instituted for the protection of children and
does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution. See id.
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protection from violence within the home. 74 Children were seen
as the property of their parents. 175 Child-rearing was left to the
parents' discretion and unfettered corporal punishment was the
prevailing means of discipline. 176 As child advocates have made
the case for the state's role in child protection,177 the legislature
and the courts have attempted to define what is acceptable treat-
ment of a child.178 Child protectors have advocated that children
have rights and that the state has an obligation to protect those
rights. 179 Both criminal and civil legislation has reflected this senti-
ment. In New York, Article 10 of the FCA has defined what acts
constitute impermissible neglect. 8 ° In addition, section 260.10 of
the New York Penal Law protects the child by criminalizing acts
that endanger the welfare of a child?81
On December 16, 1997, the New York State Assembly Standing
Committee on Children and Families held a public hearing on the
issue of law enforcement involvement in child welfare matters.1 82
The hearing was chaired by Assemblyman Roger L. Green, and
was held partly to discuss Assembly Bill 7068, which had been in-
troduced by Green in 1996.183 The Bill was intended to codify into
law the role of police and other law enforcement officials, in the
form of multi-disciplinary teams, to investigate cases of child
174. See Justin Witkin, A Time for Change: Reevaluating the Constitutional Status
of Minors, 47 FLA. L. REV. 113, 115 (1995) (stating that "[flor many centuries, chil-
dren were seen as chattels; they were mere property which was created and could be
sold or destroyed by their fathers").
175. See id.; see also Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1043 (1992) (stating
that "[tihe notion of the child as property is at least as old as the Greek and Judeo-
Christian traditions identifying man as a procreative force").
176. See id. at 1046.
177. See Moore, supra note 14, at 2066-67 n.25 (1995). The history of child protec-
tion is thought to have begun with the story of Mary Ellen Wilson in 1974. See id. at
2066 n.25. Mary Ellen was an eight-year-old girl who was chained, starved and beaten
by her adoptive parents. See id. The founder of the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals advocated on behalf of this child, claiming that, as a member of
the animal kingdom, she should be free from abuse. See id.
178. See supra Part I.C.
179. See Hon. Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000
A.D.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 543,
545 (1991) (discussing the first children's rights movement called the "child-saving"
movement).
180. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012 (McKinney 1999); see also supra Part I.C.
181. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1999); see also supra Part I.C.
182. See Public Hearing, supra note 134.
183. See id.
1073
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
abuse. 184  The hearing was intended to examine the existing
policies. 185
Assembly Bill 7068 was part of a package of bills entitled "Safe
Homes, Safe Children.1' 86 One reason for the hearing was to ex-
amine "the emergence of what appears to be a new policy within
the New York City Police Department, which has resulted in a
number of arrests of parents and custodians for alleged instances of
neglect. ' 187 Assemblyman Green expressed a concern that the new
"must arrest" policy was being expanded to apply to child neglect
cases. 1 88 In light of this possibility, the Assembly decided to ex-
amine the police policy's purpose and discern its impact on investi-
gations conducted by Child Protective Services.' 89 Bill 7068
recommended that "law enforcement personnel should participate
in inter-agency, multi-disciplinary teams and they should be
charged with the responsibility of investigating cases of sexual
abuse and other severe instances of child abuse in accordance with
the state statutes."'190 The speakers who appeared to testify at the
public hearing included legal professionals from child welfare and
criminal practices.19'
A. Arguments for Increased Police Intervention and Criminal
Prosecution of Neglect Cases
Of all of the "great sins against children," neglect is often consid-
ered to be less severe than physical and sexual abuse.' 92 While
more than a half of the children in child protective services agen-
184. Assembly Bill 7068 was amended and enacted as section 422(14) of the New
York Social Services Law to allow disclosure of certain information of the statewide
central register of child abuse and maltreatment for the purpose of prosecuting a
charge of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree under section 240.55 of
the New York Penal Law.
185. See Public Hearing, supra note 134.
186. See id. at 7.




191. Those in attendance included representatives of the Juvenile Rights Division
of the Legal Aide Society, the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, New York University Law Professor Martin Guggenheim and New York
City Criminal Court - Kings County Judge Martin Karopkin. The Assembly was dis-
appointed to find that neither New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir nor
ACS Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta attended the public hearing. Neither sent a
representative in his place.
192. Deborah Blum, Attention Deficit: Physical and Sexual Child Abuse Grab All
the Headlines. But What You May Not Realize is That Neglect Can Be Worse, 24
MOTHER JONES 58 (1999).
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cies are victims of neglect, it is physical and sexual abuse that draw
the most attention and the most serious reaction from the public. 193
However, a growing number or researchers are finding that neglect
may in fact have a more severe long-term impact on a child than
either physical or sexual abuse. 194
Advocates of active police involvement in, and criminal prosecu-
tion of, child neglect assert that the civil FCA and the criminal Pe-
nal Law are separate and necessary legislation to deal with the
growing problem of child neglect.195 The child protection system
serves the important purpose of rehabilitating families in crisis. 196
The criminal justice system maintains order by restraining perpe-
trators, and deterring and punishing crime.' 97 Ann Reiniger of the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children stated
the following in support of proposed New York Assembly Bill
7068:
The role of the police is to enforce the law on behalf of chil-
dren through the arrest of offenders followed by criminal prose-
cution and punishment for the violation of the law. The role of
child protective services is to protect children by assessing risk
as it impacts on the child and providing services with the author-
ity to remove children, if necessary.' 98
This distinction exemplifies the different purposes embodied in
the civil and criminal systems. These different purposes are
thought to justify separate systems dealing with the same problem.
193. See id. (stating that neglect accounts for 52%, abuse 24% and sexual abuse
6%, with the remaining attributable to medical abuse, emotional maltreatment and
unidentified factors).
194. See id. Studies by Bruce Perry, chief of psychiatry at Texas Children's Hospi-
tal in Houston and Susan Rose, professor at the School of Social Welfare at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin in Milwaukee have indicated that victims of child neglect may
suffer more severe developmental delays than victims of other kinds of abuse. See id.
Penelope Trickett, a child abuse expert at the University of Southern California has
studied the developmental consequences of physical abuse, sexual abuse and neglect
and concluded that neglected children exhibit the most severe delays in learning and
social development. See id. Perry even offers physical proof of the damage done by
neglect. His proof consists of a slide of a child's brain who was a victim of global
neglect. The slide shows the ventricles of the brain, which should be small at the stage
of development captured, to be tripled in size and filled with fluid because the sur-
rounding brain did not grow to its full potential. He attributes this developmental
delay to the neglect. Other studies have indicated similar developmental delays asso-
ciated with neglect. See id.
195. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part I.C.
197. See supra note 169.
198. See Public Hearing, supra note 134 (statement of Ann Reiniger).
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Children have the right to be free from harm or risk at the hands
of their parents. Proponents of criminal sanctions for child neglect
argue that because endangerment is a criminal act, the state has an
obligation to protect children from it, and prosecute offenders.1 99
The police can take an offender into custody upon making a deter-
mination of probable cause.2 0 The New York City "must-arrest"
policy in cases of domestic violence has already proven that safety
within the home is a public matter, and has helped ensure that
safety.20
1
Violence in the home no longer enjoys the privacy and protec-
tion that historically sheltered abusers from prosecution. 20 2 This
development reflects society's disapproving sentiment toward vio-
lence in the home, which,, in turn, enforces the value society places
on safe homes.20 3 Children, as victims, are less able to protect
themselves and are more deserving of state intervention.
In home alone cases, the police will contact ACS or bring the
child to the precinct to await the arrival of child protective serv-
ices.20' An arrest warrant is issued for the parent, who, when
found, will be charged with child endangerment. 20 5 The police take
this action, rather than simply calling ACS, because they fear the
child's safety will be jeopardized if ACS engages in a lengthy inves-
tigation. The police act swiftly so as to ensure that if a mistake is
made, they will have erred on the side of caution. Police Commis-
sioner Safir has stated that "even if we make a mistake in an inter-
vention, that's a mistake that doesn't really harm a child. '2 6
Criminal prosecution advocates support a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to child protection.20 7 This approach involves social work-
199. See In re Maria F., 428 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (noting that the state has
an obligation to protect the health, safety and well-being of children).
200. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No. t06-15, supra note 100.
201. See Donald Bertrand, Domestic Violence Up, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 5, 1998,
at 1 (quoting Queens District Attorney Richard Brown that the police department's
mandatory arrest policy has helped increase public awareness about domestic vio-
lence and provide help to victims).
202. See supra Parts I.A-B.
203. See Cathy Young, Domestic Violations, REASON, Feb. 1998, at 24 (discussing
how, in the campaign against domestic abuse, many states have instituted policies of
mandatory arrests in domestic violence cases; and how these policies have increased
arrests and addressed the problem of domestic violence).
204. See supra Part I.B.; see also POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No.
119-05: CHILDREN OR MINORS REQUIRING SHELTER (1995) (on file with the author).
205. Interview with Carmen Melendez, Spokesperson for the New York City Police
Department Office of Media Relations (Mar. 1999).
206. See Golden, supra note 113, at 5.
207. See Public Hearing, supra note 134 (statement of Ann Reiniger).
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ers, law enforcement and medical personnel working together to
identify and address both neglect and abuse.2 °8 Ann Reiniger ad-
vocated increased collaboration between the New York Police De-
partment and ACS: "Our goal should be to protect children by
combining the punitive and the rehabilitative approaches."2 9 She
did assert, however, that arrests should not be made without first
consulting with Child Protective Services.210
One element of the criminal procedure law that can be helpful in
child protection is a temporary order of protection. Under New
York Criminal Procedure Law, when a criminal action is pending
involving a complaint charging any crime or violation between
spouses, former spouses, parent and child or between members of
the same family or household, the court may issue a temporary or-
der of protection.z1 The court may issue this order ex parte upon
the filing of an accusatory instrument and for good cause shown. 212
It is common practice in criminal prosecutions for the prosecutor
to request the court to issue such an order of protection barring the
parent from contact with the child.213 Nothing in the criminal stat-
utes requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to be
heard where a temporary order of protection has been requested.
As a result, the temporary order may be issued without a hear-
ing.2 14 If convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, the puni-
tive nature of criminal prosecutions allows for the levying of a
punishment that fits the crime. 15
B. Arguments for the Child Protective System and Family
Court as More Appropriate Adjudicator of
Child Neglect
The family court was designed and created to deal with the




211. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1) (McKinney 1999).
212. See id. § 530.12(3).
213. See Golden, supra note 113.
214. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12 (3).
215. Upon entering a guilty verdict for child endangerment, the judge can levy a
sentence of up to one year imprisonment. Under section 260.10 of the New York
Penal Law, "endangering the welfare of a child" is a class A misdemeanor. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1999). Under section 70.15, a sentence of imprison-
ment for up to one year can be levied for a class A misdemeanor. See id. § 70.15.
216. See WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., Ass'N B. N.Y.C., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN
THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY: A REPORT AND STUDY ON THE ADMINISTRATION
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criminalization of child neglect focus on the inability of the crimi-
nal justice system to adequately accommodate the unique needs of
the family.217 They cite the historical development of child protec-
tive services and family court jurisdiction as a sophisticated and
appropriate response to the fragile nature of family offenses.218
The FCA recognizes the need for specialized attention for fami-
lies. Under the Act, the family court has "exclusive original juris-
diction" in abuse and neglect proceedings, except for the
jurisdiction retained by the supreme court.219 Judge Karopkin of
the New York City Kings County Criminal Court points out that
where an arrest is made and a criminal court prosecution pursued,
"the Criminal Court becomes the first court to address issues in-
volving removal of the child from the parent. This practice seems
to ignore the FCA and fails to make use of procedures that are
already in place to protect the interests of the child and the
parent."220
As a unique and fragile institution, the family has been deemed
deserving of specialized attention and services.221 The family court
and ACS have well-developed services and procedures to protect
children and to assess and treat families in crisis. Through the use
of such practices, the child welfare system protects the psychologi-
cal and emotional well-being of a child as well as maintains the
unity of the family.
The family court has jurisdiction over ACS and can compel the
agency to provide services or even to investigate allegations. 2
This power gives the court the benefit of the input of trained child
welfare professionals in determining the needs of the child. 2 3
Child protection workers and family court judges are guided by
statutes that strike a delicate balance between the goals of family
preservation and child protection.224 This balance gives these child
OF LAWS RELATING TO THE FAMILY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1954) (documenting
the history of the "urbanized family" in New York City and the development of a
children's court and a family court to deal with the unique and complex problems of
families). In 1933, the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York com-
bined the children's court with the family court, which had previously been a branch
of the magistrates' court. See id. at 27.
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See id.
219. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 114, 115 (McKinney 1999).
220. See Karopkin, supra note 8.
221. See GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 216.
222. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1034, 1039 (McKinney 1999).
223. See In re Tashyne L., 384 N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 1976).
224. New York Social Services Law promotes family preservation by requiring ACS
to provide preventive services to families in need and by requiring caseworkers to
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protection workers the latitude to use their discretion and make
informed decisions on a child by child basis.225 Child protective
workers are obligated under the New York Social Services Law to
preserve families wherever possible.226 However, because the best
interests of the child are paramount in child protection decisions,227
there are due process protections in family court procedure that
prevent the unnecessary separation of parent and child.228 While
there are due process protections in criminal court, they are for
the individual. They are not for the family as a unit.
One important indicator of the "best interests of the child 229
standard in family court adjudications is the appointing of a law
guardian to all children who are the subjects of abuse and neglect
cases.23 ° The FCA provides that, at the first court date, all subject
children be appointed a law guardian who is assigned to represent
the child in the child protective proceedings.2 31 The theory behind
this practice is that the most thorough and effective prosecution of
a neglectful parent in family court does not always allow for the
effective representation of the child's best interests.232 In his
prosecutorial role, the Commissioner of ACS seeks a finding of ne-
glect or abuse against the parent.233 Independent representation
create a family service plan whenever a child is considered for foster care placement.
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 409-a-e (McKinney 1999). New York Social Services Law
promotes child protection by empowering social services officials to investigate com-
plaints of abuse and neglect and to offer protective services to prevent injury to chil-
dren. See id. §§ 397, 398.
225. New York Social Services Law gives public welfare officers the power to inves-
tigate the family circumstances of each child reported to them in order to determine
what, if any, assistance is needed. See id. § 398(6)(a).
226. Section of 409-a of the New York Social Services Law identifies family preser-
vation as a priority in requiring ACS to provide preventive services when foster care
placement of a child is threatened. See id. § 409-a.
227. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 623.
228. See, e.g., id. § 1027(a) (providing that in any case where there has been an
emergency removal of a child, the court shall hold a hearing as soon as practicable
after the filing of the petition to determine whether the child's interests require pro-
tection pending a final order of disposition).
229. See supra note 47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the best interests
standard.
230. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1033-b.
231. See id.
232. See generally Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, I Know the Child
is My Client, But Who Am 1?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1920 (1996).
233. See COMMITrEE ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N, LAW
GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS 111 (1996) [hereinafter "LAw GUARDIAN
STANDARDS"].
Prosecution or presentment of the petition is not the law guardian's function
- the County Attorney or county Department of Social Services counsel ful-
fills that purpose. Equally, defending a client against charges is not the law
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for the child is necessary to give the court a full picture of the fam-
ily and its needs, as well as an informed child perspective. 3 The
law guardian is charged with putting the interest of the child first
and foremost.235
Section 249 of the FCA governs the appointment of law guardi-
ans.2 36 The proceedings in which law guardians are appointed have
been slowly expanded by the legislature and the courts.237 This ex-
pansion is due to recognition that because of the possibility of ad-
versity between the interests of the parent and the child, it would
be difficult for one attorney to represent them both.238 That a law
guardian is appointed by the court to represent the minor, and not
retained by the parent, ensures true independence of represen-
tation. 39
guardian's responsibility - the attorney for the respondent fulfills that pur-
pose and the child is the alleged victim rather than the accused. Thus,
neither the parents, parents' counsel, Department of Social Services and its
counsel, nor the Court can properly represent the child.
Id.
234. See id. at 112.
The law guardian's primary statutory function is to articulate and litigate the
child's position, and to protect the child's legal interests. In addition, the law
guardian should insure that every fact in support of the child's position
which may be relevant to preliminary orders, fact-finding proceedings or dis-
positional remedies, is presented to the Court.
Id.
235. See id. at 111 ("The law guardian's representation must be confined to the
interests of the child - and only the child.").
236. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 249(a) (stating "in a proceeding under articles 7, 3 or
10 or under § 384(b) of the Social Services Law... or when a minor is sought to be
placed in protective custody under § 158, the Family Court shall appoint a law guard-
ian ... "). When the New York Supreme Court has before it a case under the FCA, it
enjoys the power to appoint a law guardian. See Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396
N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
237. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 249(a) (commentary by Douglas J. Besharov).
238. "[I]t is generally assumed that parents should not and.., cannot engage coun-
sel to represent their own children in child protective proceedings initiated against
them or in which they are an interested party because the appearance of a possible
conflict of interest and the danger of an actual conflict is too great to tolerate." Id.
239. See LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 233, at 112 ("By requiring the
law guardian to protect the child's 'interests' (rather than promote the 'best interests'
of the child), the Legislature clearly intended law guardians to perform a function
distinct from the judicial assessment of the best interests of the child."). Under sec-
tion 623 of the FCA, when a judge makes a dispositional order, the best interests of
the child are the paramount concern. See id. at 113.
The law guardian's role at trial, or fact-finding hearing, is extensive, and fre-
quently crucial. Recent caselaw imposes a high burden of effective represen-
tation, including the responsibility of proving or disproving child abuse or
neglect when appropriate. The law guardian must be a full participant, in-
troducing evidence and effectively examining and cross-examining witnesses.
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The FCA and Social Services Law also contain provisions for
protecting parents' rights to due process. When child protective
services has removed a child in cases of suspected abuse or neglect
without a court order, a hearing must be held as soon as practicable
after the petition is filed.24 ° The petition must prove imminent risk
to the child's life or health and that protective custody is necessary
to avoid this risk.241 While parents need not be present at this
hearing, their due process rights are protected by the procedure set
forth in section 1028 of the FCA for the return of a child temporar-
ily removed.242 Upon the request of a parent, a section 1028 hear-
ing must be held within three days of the parent's application for
an order returning a child who has been removed.243 At such a
hearing, the court must assess imminent risk to a child's life or
health.244
Because a child is represented by a law guardian at these hear-
ings, the child's due process rights are protected as well.245 In 1987,
section 1028 was amended to authorize the law guardian to make
an application for the return of a child.246 With the law guardian as
the voice of the child in the courtroom, the child can now partici-
pate in this important stage of child protective proceedings.247
Opponents of the trend of criminalizing neglect make a clear dis-
tinction between abuse and neglect. They are concerned that in
many of the cases currently prosecuted for child endangerment, the
alleged offending acts are merely symptoms of poverty.248 They
assert that police practices are outdated examples of state paternal-
ism and that the police are not properly trained to deal with child
240. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1027.
241. See id. § 1027(b).
242. See In re Z., 339 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 1972).
243. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1028(a).
244. See id.
245. The appointment of the law guardian in family court protects the child's due
process rights by giving her a voice. See, e.g., In re Orlando F., 351 N.E.2d 711 (N.Y.
1976).
246. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1028(a).
247. See id. Under section 1028, the application for an order mandating the return
of the child need not be made within any prescribed time limit, so long as it is made
before an adjudication of abuse or neglect. See id. § 1028, at 42 (commentary by
Douglas J. Besharov). Therefore, the timing of requesting a 1028 hearing often in-
volves important strategic considerations. See id. at 45. Before this amendment, the
timing was largely under the discretion of the parents, and the child had no mecha-
nism to bring on request to be returned. See id. The amendment now provides such a
mechanism. See id. § 1028(a).
248. For example, home alone cases often are instances where the parent was at the
store or at work and could not afford childcare. See Swarns, supra note 74.
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neglect, which is often difficult to identify.249 While a collaborative
effort between the police and ACS may assist caseworkers in deal-
ing with massive case loads, critics of criminalization are concerned
that the police are showing little discretion in implementing the
policy on child protection.25 °
In her opinion in People v. Smith,251 Judge Smith expressed con-
cern over the increasing number of "home alone cases" appearing
in criminal court. 52 She pointed out that the statute, section 260.10
of the New York Penal Law, provides no guidelines on this sub-
ject.253 Judge Smith discussed how leaving non-infant children
within the care of responsible twelve- and thirteen-year-old siblings
is a "common and well established tradition,"'254 and further that
"[t]his practice is not based purely on economic factors, but rather,
touches on the very essence of the concept of family and child rear-
ing goals aimed at fostering and encouraging independence, re-
sponsibility, love and support among siblings. 255
In dismissing the charges, Judge Smith stated:
Until such time as the legislature clarifies its intentions with re-
spect to these often troubling "home alone" cases, so that the
public in general, and unwary parents in particular, can be made
aware of the legal ramifications of leaving children home alone;
well established and traditionally accepted community standards
must continue to be carefully applied on a case by case basis.256
Opponents of criminal prosecution argue that there is an identi-
fiable harm in zealous prosecution of child neglect.257 For one, it
restricts the commissioner of ACS's discretion in filing a neglect
249. See Public Hearing, supra note 134 (statement of Professor Martin
Guggenheim).
It is nothing short of astonishing to observe the Mayor of the City of New
York in 1997 enter the fray as a new kid on the block and come up with the
atavistic, long-rejected concept of using the police power to arrest, finger
print, detain, arraign and prosecute parents merely because the police have
probable cause to believe a parent has endangered the welfare of a child.
Id. "[T]he assessment of neglect requires a professional assessment by trained per-
sonnel, social workers, caseworkers, and we need to know what role should law en-
forcement have in making assessments of child abuse and of child neglect." Id.
250. Jill Zuccardy argues against the "misuse of the 'must arrest' statute [and] the
New York Police Department policy of using 'must arrest' as a justification for acting
independently of ACS in cases of alleged child neglect .... " Supra note 68.
251. 678 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Crim. Ct. 1998).




256. Id. at 876.
257. See Public Hearing, supra note 134.
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petition.258 If a parent is arrested for child endangerment, a ne-
glect petition will most likely have to be filed. The fact that the
parent has been accused of acts that endanger the welfare of the
child, and that the parent has been taken into police custody can
provide the impetus for ACS to file regardless of the agency's own
assessment of the allegations. 9 Once a family court proceeding is
initiated, it is difficult to stop.260 Heavy caseloads and backlogged
dockets make the proceedings move slowly, and children can lan-
guish in foster care indefinitely.2 61 This delay is a problem because
under the new federal regulations, the New York codifications of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the longer a child remains in
foster care, the more likely parental rights termination proceedings
will be initiated.262
There is also another concern about criminalization that arises
when, despite an arrest and prosecution, no family court petition is
filed by ACS. The concern is that if there is no concurrent family
court case, the orders of protection issued by criminal court will be
the only standing order in the case, and it is an order that does not
take into account the best interests of the child.263 Often judges in
criminal court will issue orders of protection with a clause that
makes them "subject to family court," which relies on the family
court judge to ameliorate the situation.264 Here, the concern is not
that the arrest initiates a family court case, but rather that, without
a concurrent family court case, a full protection order remains in
place, barring the parent from seeing the child. Judge Karopkin
258. See id.
259. According to the ACS Office of Public Information, under ACS policy, the
arrest of a parent does not necessarily lead to ACS intervention or to the filing of a
petition. However, when speaking with a Emergency Children's Services worker, the
author was informed that, in practice, if a parent is arrested for child endangerment,
this creates a presumption of neglect, and the agency will take action.
260. See Megan M. O'Laughlin, A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be
the Key to Stopping the Pendulum of Terminations vs. Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1427, 1433 (1998) (stating that, according to statistics, children removed from their
homes and placed in foster care spend an average of three years in the system, and
that one in ten will spend more than seven years in foster care, and attributing these
delays to the complex foster care system).
261. See id.
262. Under the New York Social Services Law, if a child has been in foster care for
fifteen of the last twenty-two months, ACS may be required to file a petition to termi-
nate parental rights. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 392(6)(i) (McKinney 1999).
263. Telephone interview with Martin Karopkin, J. (Apr. 13, 1999).
264. Id.
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found this concern to be so compelling that, as a result, he often
issues limited, rather than full, orders.265
Opponents of criminalization point out that arresting parents for
neglect is one of many contradictions of the New York City child
welfare system.266 While the public may like the image of police
rescuing children in danger, most people do not consider the conse-
quences of this police action.267 Often, the charges are dropped,
and even when they are not, the criminal prosecution does little to
mend the family.268 There is also a concern that parents who face
poverty will be less likely to reach out and ask for assistance and
services if they feel that drawing attention to themselves will leave
them vulnerable to arrest.269 If parents are not willing to access the
available services that provide housing and child care, then chil-
dren will suffer.270
While many criminal acts committed against children, including
physical and sexual abuse, require criminal prosecution and pun-
ishment, neglect is often the product of poor parenting skills, pov-
erty or cultural barriers. 271 These barriers are problems that can be
overcome through social work counseling, court supervision and
access to services.272 In these cases it is often in the child's best
interests to remain with the family - in such a case, family preser-
vation is a viable priority because it is the child's best interest. 3
Since the 1970s, child protective services have rejected separation
of parent and child as the predominant approach to abuse and ne-
glect.274 Reasonable efforts at preserving families replaced the
265. See id.
266. See Ilze Betins, Child Welfare Doesn't Belong in Police Hands, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1997, at A30 (Ilze Betins is the program director at El Faro Beacon Youth
and Family Service.).
267. See id.
268. See app. infra, tbl.5.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See Bailie, supra note 138, at 2294 ("[F]amilies involved in neglect proceedings
are overwhelmingly poor.").
272. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(3) (McKinney 1999) ("As far as possible fami-
lies shall be kept together, they shall not be separated for reasons of poverty alone,
and they shall be provided services to maintain and strengthen family life.").
273. See id. The Social Services Law contains a presumption that family preserva-
tion is often in the child's best interest, and therefore remains a primary goal of the
regulations. See id.
274. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child. A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1975) (noting
that the predominant approach to protecting children in the 1970s was to separate the
child from the parent).
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"child rescue philosophy" of the 1970s.275 This pro-family senti-
ment acknowledged that separating a child from her parents can be
damaging to a child's emotional health.276
In child endangerment cases, the police and the criminal court
have the ability to interfere with the parent-child relationship by
determining when acts of neglect constitute criminal activity and by
issuing orders of protection that prevent the parent from contact-
ing the child.277 The debate over criminalization must consider to
what degree this policy jeopardizes the constitutional right to the
parent-child relationship. This debate raises the question of what
rights the child has to remain with her family. That determination
involves weighing the child's liberty interest in family autonomy
and unity with the state's interest in a thorough and expeditious
prosecution of criminally-neglectful parents.
C. The Constitutional Rights Implicated by Criminalizing
Child Welfare
1. The Constitutional Status of the Family
The integrity of the family Unit has found protection in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ninth Amend-
ment. 78 While the State has a substantial interest in protecting mi-
nor children, parents and children have a constitutional right to
remain together with limited governmental interference.279 In
275. See Bailie, supra note 138, at nn.43-47 and accompanying text.
276. See id. at 2290. See generally Areen, supra note 138.
277. See infra notes 291-295 and accompanying text.
278. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (holding that
"[t]his Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple cita-
tion that a parent's desire for a right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and man-
agement of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants
deference and... protection."' (citations omitted)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972). See also U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
279. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (empha-
sizing the "'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"')); see also Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 645; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(establishing the right of parents to control the upbringing and education of their
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d
817 (2d Cir. 1977).
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1923, the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right of child-
rearing in Meyer v. Nebraska28 0 when it struck down a statute that
made it unlawful to teach foreign languages to grade school chil-
dren.21 A few years later, the Court struck down an Oregon stat-
ute requiring public school attendance that effectively outlawed
private and home schooling in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.28 2
The concept of family autonomy has been incorporated into the
modern right to privacy, which is considered part of the First
Amendment's "penumbra" of associational privacy.28 3 These
"penumbral rights ensured that the specific rights stated in the Bill
of Rights would remain secure. ' '2s4 In Roe v. Wade, Justice Black-
mun stated that the Court has recognized that "a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist in the Constitution. ' 2 5 The origin of the right of privacy
is both in property rights as well as liberty rights.28 6 Historically,
privacy in the constitutional (as opposed to tort) sense was de-
fined not as an individual right, but rather a right belonging to
the institutions of marriage and family.287 Eventually, privacy
developed into an individual right.288 The modern right to pri-
vacy was primarily cultivated by the Court in the 1960s and
1970s.2 9
Historically, the family unit enjoyed a great deal of autonomy
from the State. Family members existed in gender-based roles, and
the family as an institution maintained a great deal of privacy.290
However, increasing public concern for women and children within
280. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
281. See id.
282. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
283. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that several
of the Bill of Rights' guarantees protect privacy interests and create a zone of pri-
vacy). Douglas' majority opinion described Meyer and Pierce as part of the First
Amendment's penumbra. See id. at 482-83.
284. David Fisher, Parental Rights and the Right to Intimate Association, 48 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 399, 426 (1997).
285. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
286. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLIT-
ICAL DISCOURSE 47-66 (1991).
287. See id.
288. See id. ("Eisenstadt marked the elevation to constitutional status of an individ-
ual's right to be let alone.").
289. See Fisher, supra note 284, at 407. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (declaring the right of a married couple to receive and use contraceptive
devices); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (upholding the right to privacy and
freedom to associate).
290. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 267 (1990).
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the home has led to increased state involvement over the years.291
Today, the State has tremendous power to intervene in the family
on behalf of a child.292 While this power represents the State's im-
portant interest in the safety of children, it has been criticized be-
cause zealous advocacy can often result in the witch-hunting of
parents.293 In response to increased State involvement, parents
have actively pursued the right to autonomous decision-making
and freedom from State interference. 294 As a result, modern dis-
course on the family and familial obligations has centered on the
parents' rights versus those of the State, i.e., the right to care for
children, to direct their education, and to have custody. 95 Child
advocates argue that this focus has lost sight of the child's interest
in these very same rights, the elements' that make up the parent-
child relationship. 296
2. The Constitutional Status of the Child
Children have always held a unique status in the context of con-
stitutional rights.297 While they are members of a family and there-
fore have some entitlement to the family autonomy that the
Supreme Court has recognized, they are not adults and therefore
retain a status that is not wholly independent.
As the law has progressed, children have been held to have cer-
tain constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the "personhood" of children.298 In Tinker v. Des Moines In-
291. See id. at 271.
292. In New York, section 1024 of the FCA provides-for emergency removal of a
child if the child is in "imminent danger." See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
293. See supra part I.B.
294. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (empha-
sizing the "'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"')); see also
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing the right of par-
ents to control the upbringing and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
295. See supra note 294.
296. See, e.g., Melinda A. Roberts, Parent and Child in Conflict: Between Liberty
and Responsibility, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 485 (1996). "The
liberal model considers adults to have the right to make choices for themselves be-
cause they are both independent and rational. Lacking these distinctive characteris-
tics, children are not considered, within the liberal model, rights-bearers." Id. at 491.
297. See Justin Witkin, A Time for Change: Reevaluating the Constitutional Status
of Minors, 47 FLA. L. REV. 113 (1995).
298. Protectors of children's rights have promoted a theory of human rights and
human dignity in the struggle to establish constitutional personhood for children. See
Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives
and the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 11, 26 (1994). In A Time for Change: Reevaluating the
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dependent Community School District,299 the Court stated that mi-
nors are included in the constitutional concept of "person" and
that children are possess fundamental rights that the State must
respect. 30 0 In In re Gault,30 1 the Court stated that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone. "302
The concept of children having rights within the constitution is
well-grounded. Advocates of children's rights often think the inad-
equacy of those rights is grounded in the failure of society to iden-
tify children as "persons" in the constitutional sense. 3  Despite
the Court's acknowledgment of the personhood of children, a bar-
rier has remained that prevents children from participation equal
to that of their social status, ability and need. Liberalism and the
triumph of individual rights and autonomy have developed the
modern concept of parental rights in such a way as to focus child
welfare disputes on a parent-versus-state model. 304 This model has
Constitutional Status of Minors, Justin Witkin presumes a liberal interpretive theory is
necessary to protect the rights of children. See Witkin, supra note 297, at 131. Witkin
embraces a "human rights theory" to understand the scope of the protections pro-
vided to children by the Constitution. See id. at 132. He advocates that "human dig-
nity mandates that the Constitution provide equal protection for the autonomy and
capacity for autonomy of all children that it provides for adults." Id. at 135. "The
Constitution might be seen as guaranteeing that adults will 'have a voice' in processes
which affect their person and/or property. This guarantee should apply to children as
well." Id. at 135, n.182 (citing Charles R. Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of
Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1312-14 (1988)).
299. 393 U.S. 503 (1.969) (recognizing children's First Amendment rights and hold-
ing that a school could not prohibit students from wearing black armbands to protest
the Vietnam War).
300. Id. at 511.
301. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
302. Id. at 13.
303. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 26.
The liberal constitutional view of persons as autonomous individuals and the
popular view of children as anything but autonomous individuals clash irrec-
oncilably. As a result, when deciding constitutional issues involving children
the Supreme Court has inadvertently demonstrated the inadequacy of the
liberal model of personhood for children.
Id.
304. Some constitutional theorists have asserted that the liberal movement has de-
fined the individual by the individual's relationship with the State. See id. at 23.
Under traditional liberal theory, government "should provide a framework of rights
that respects persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their own
values and ends." MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996). Some authors assert that interpreting
the Constitution by reference to the liberal model leads to a constitutional system that
favors the parents' interests as against the child's. See Roberts, supra note 296, at 491.
Parents have fought for their liberty and privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and typically the conflict was between the parents' and the State's perception of
1088
CRIMINALIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE
spawned a debate that alleges that liberalism leaves the child voice-
less in determinations that gravely affect the child's status as a per-
son and as a family member.3°5 This critique of liberalism asserts
that while liberalism has been a successful vehicle for the triumph
of individual rights for parents, it has failed to encompass individ-
ual rights for children.30 6 This dubious victory is because the em-
phasis on individuals' rights and autonomy has focused family law
debates on parents' rights versus the State.3"' The child has legiti-
mate and enforceable rights to liberty and due process, which indi-
cate that she deserves representation when a court makes a
custodial determination.30 8 However, it is presumed that either the
State or her parent has her best interests accurately identified and
adequately represented. 30 9  1
Proponents of children's rights assert that it is no wonder that
children have a level of participation that is unequal to that of their
status, ability and needs.310 They claim that the constitutional im-
balance between the rights of parents and the rights of children is
the result of a liberal theory of constitutional interpretation.3
Under liberal political theory, the prevailing political philosophy of
the time, the government "should provide a framework of rights
that respects persons as free and independent selves, capable of
choosing their own values and ends. ' 312 The State is to remain
neutral on the subject of what is "the good life" in order to respect
the child's best interest. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding
the state's interest in universal education is subject to a balancing test when it in-
fringes on fundamental rights - here the right of parents to handle the religious up-
bringing of their children, after Amish parents refused to send their children to public
school in violation of state law); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (es-
tablishing the right of parents to control the upbringing and education of their chil-
dren); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding parents' rights to
determine their children's education). In this way, the liberal model, which focuses
on the parent as an individual, has focused. the family matter disputes on a parent-
versus-state model. See Sandel, supra note 304.
305. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298.
306. See id.
307. See supra note 286.
308. See supra notes 279-282 and accompanying text.
309. Melinda Roberts asserts that "cases in which children have been taken to have
constitutional rights are cases in which the parents' and child's interests typically coin-
cide." Roberts, supra note 296, at 492 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)). David Fisher asserts that part of the reason for this development is the pre-
sumption that parents act in the best interests of their children, a presumption that
has been upheld by the Court even in cases involving abuse and neglect. See Fisher,
supra note 284, at 412.
310. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 23.
311. See id.
312. Sandel, supra note 304, at 4.
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the individual rights of persons.3 a3 The liberal movement has de-
fined the individual by the individual's relationship with the
State.314 Proponents of this interpretation advocate the notion of
the State respecting the autonomous individual's choices and deci-
sion-making.315 The republic's role in enforcing liberty is predomi-
nantly procedural; it is charged with ensuring the dignity and
autonomy of individuals.316 The individual, as an "unencumbered
self, ' 317 is free to make decisions without State intervention. The
State may only interfere with autonomy to the degree that it is nec-
essary in order to preserve the autonomy of others.318
3. The Child's Constitutional Rights within the Family
The constitutionally protected liberty interest in the parent-child
relationship extends to the child as well as the parent. It is "the
right of the family to remain together without the coercive interfer-
ence of the awesome power of the state. ' 31 9 A child has a liberty
interest in remaining with a parent. It has been decided that the
forcible removal of a child from parents constitutes seizure subject
to the Fourth Amendment requirements.32 ° While removing a par-
ent from a child may not restrict the child's liberty interest in her
freedom, it does restrict the child's liberty interest in remaining
with her family. In Quillion v. Walcott321 the Court stated: "We
313. See id. at 92.
314. See Fitzgerald, supra, note 298, at 24.
315. See id. at 23.
316. See id.
317. Sandel criticizes the liberal model because it promotes the notion of the unen-
cumbered self, and ignores the individual's responsibilities as a member of a commu-
nity. He promotes a civic republicanism that focuses more on membership,
participation and contribution, rather than on insulation. He proposes that "[t]he
public philosophy by which we live cannot secure the liberty it promises, because it
cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement that liberty requires."
Sandel, supra note 304, at 6.
318. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 24.
319. Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Duchesne v.
Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977)). Other circuit courts agree that a "child's
interest in her relationship with a parent is sufficiently weighty by itself to constitute a
cognizable liberty interest." Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.
1991) (quoting Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987)). "The
integrity of the parent-child relationship is harmed by depriving children of adult care
320. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992); U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
321. 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
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have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship be-
tween parent and child is constitutionally protected. 322
However, the constitutional status of the child within the family
is not considered wholly secure by some child advocates.323 There
is concern that especially within the acute situation where the
State's over-protective inclination aims to remove a child from her
parent, the parent's rights are balanced with the State's interest,
and this balance neglects the child's own rights and interest.324 This
view can be critiqued in that it is not a comprehensive approach to
the family's right to privacy and autonomy because it fails to ac-
knowledge the child as a central bearer of those rights.325 It is ar-
gued that when a court sides with a parent or with the State, it is
justified by the assertion that the prevailing party's interest in the
child represents the best interest of the child herself, but that the
child's interest is rarely represented in and of itself.326
The debate over criminalizing child welfare in New York City
has involved various articulations of the core problem, and pro-
positions for the most appropriate solution.
III. CRIMINALIZING CHILD WELFARE DOEs NOT ADEQUATELY
PROTECT THE RIGHTs OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
A. Identifying the Problem with Criminalization
Child neglect is a severe societal ailment. While it is different
from child abuse, it is no less harmful and may have more long-
term effects.327 The evolution of the child protective system signi-
fies that society will not tolerate child neglect.328 This development
also signifies that the family and the child are unique and that a
unique approach and a specialized system are necessary to deal
with problems. 329 This specialized system is necessary because
traditional criminal justice does not address the problem of pre-
serving families and does not take into account the best interest of
322. Id.
323. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 17, 22-23.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See Roberts, supra note 296, at 492 n.16 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954)) (asserting that "cases in which children have been taken to have
constitutional rights are cases in which the parents' and child's interests typically
coincide.").
327. See supra Part II.A.
328. See supra Part I.A.
329. See supra Part ll.B. for an overview of family court.
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the child. The child protective system and the family court as gov-
erned by the FCA are specifically designed for this consideration.
Opponents of the criminalization trend argue that the police
have no role in child welfare. 330 However, because neglect is a
crime under the child endangerment statute, and because the prob-
lem of neglect affects all of society - as do most crimes - law en-
forcement must play a role. Society cannot demand public
attention to child welfare and then exclude law enforcement. In
addition, while many of the arrests made are truly erring on the
side of caution, many others are justified.331 Even in home alone
cases, there is a broad range of benign circumstances leading up to
this neglect. Some unfortunate parents, on account of a lack of
daycare resources, have merely left children in the care of an older
sibling or alone briefly for a trip to the market. Here, poverty is
often the primary cause of the "neglectful" actions, and poverty
should not indiscriminately be mistook for neglect.3 3 2 Other egre-
gious circumstances have uncovered parents' blatant disregard for
their children's well-being.333 It would be inappropriate to lump
these cases together.
From 1990 to 1998, the number of arrests where the primary
charge was "endangering the welfare of a child" has more than
tripled.334 It is important to identify the significance of this in-
crease. Does it mean that there is more neglect and therefore
more arrests? Answering this question requires a look at the
number of abuse/neglect reports that came into the child protective
system. From 1990 to 1998, the number of these reports has in-
330. See supra Part II.B.
331. The arrests are often justified in that the parents have left the child in a dan-
gerous situation. See, e.g., Associated Press, Teen Mother Arrested After Leaving In-
fants Alone, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 6A (describing how a teenager in Harlem
was arrested for leaving one-year-old and two-year-old alone with food smoldering on
stove while she went out partying all night).
332. New York Social Services Law acknowledges poverty as a factor that may re-
sult in conditions that are symptomatic of, and therefore mistaken to be, neglect. See
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131[3] (McKinney 1999) ("As far as possible, families shall be
kept together, they shall not be separated for reasons of poverty alone, and they shall
be provided services to maintain and strengthen family life.").
333. For example, in 1997 a Russian couple were arrested for endangering the wel-
fare of a child when they left their four-year-old daughter home alone all night while
they were out partying in an upscale Manhattan club. See Barbara Ross et al., Party
Parents Busted for Leaving Girl, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 1997, at 4.
334. See app. infra, tbl.5. In 1990, the number of arrests was 303, whereas in 1998, it
was 1111.
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creased only slightly.335 In addition, while the number of reports
coming into the State Central Registry has increased slightly, the
number of Article 10 petitions filed has actually gone down
substantially.336
Overall, these numbers seem to indicate that it is not that there
is more neglect, it is that the police are making more arrests. While
it is exactly this "trend" that has concerned some child and family
advocates, the increase in arrests may not be as alarming as is
feared. That is because the number of arrests is still minute com-
pared to the number of reports - founded or unfounded. The 1111
arrests in 1998 represent only 1.9% of the 57,842 reports that year
and 1.01% of the 11,000 petitions filed.337 Therefore, even if the
police are arresting more neglectful parents, they are still only
reaching a fraction of the problem.
The real concern with this "trend" emerges when one looks at
the arrest statistics in and of themselves and asks whether this new
police policy is appropriate and effective. Its appropriateness is a
policy question, but whether it is effective is best determined by
looking at the dispositions of the arrests. Among the arrests for
which disposition information is available, the rate of dismissal is
extremely high.338 Of the cases that are prosecuted, the over-
whelming majority plead out and never go to trial.339 On average,
only two to three people a year (of the reported dispositions) go to
trial and get a verdict.340 It is hard to determine what increasing
arrests accomplish because few offenders serve any time or even
receive probation or fines.341
The real problem with the recent trend of arresting parents and
prosecuting them for acts of neglect is that the criminal justice sys-
tem is not equipped to deal with families in the way in which soci-
ety decided families should be dealt when it created the child
protection system. The criminal justice system can only help vic-
tims and society by keeping perpetrators away from their victims
and possibly away from society. However, this policy conflicts with
335. See app. infra, tbl.1. In 1990, the number of reports was 55,158, whereas in
1998, it was 57,842.
336. See app. infra, tbl.4. In 1990, 21,719 Article 10 petitions were filed. In 1997,
the number was 11,154 (based on this number the projected figures for 1998 are
11,000).
337. See app. infra, tbls.3-5.
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the priority that society has given to the preservation of families.342
The goals of family preservation and the child's best interests dic-
tate that the most effective means of addressing child protection
must involve more than simply punishment and protection.
Families are too complicated to fit into the rigid two-party sys-
tem of criminal justice prosecutions. Where an act of neglect has
taken place, the three parties involved, the parent, the child and
the State, may have different goals. Often the parent's goal is to be
reunited unconditionally with the child. Likewise, the State's goal
may be to keep the child from the parent, thereby ensuring her
safety and reducing state liability. The child, however, has interests
that may intersect with both those of the parent and the State, but
are not completely represented by either. Where the parent has
been neglectful by failing to properly supervise or by being unable
to fully provide for the child due to poverty, such non-violent be-
havior may not justify placing the child in foster care. In New York
City, ACS has the ability to provide multiple services to the family,
short of foster care placement of the child, to help the parent rem-
edy the neglectful behavior. 343 The child may wish to remain with
her parent. However, she would not want this reunion to be un-
conditional, which would relegate her to the powerless position of
Joshua DeShaney. 3" She may want a reunion conditioned on her
parent's compliance with State-offered parenting services, and ef-
fective supervision of that compliance by child protective workers.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, parents have been accorded
various liberty and privacy rights with respect to the custody and
care of their children.345 In the cases that gave rise to these rights,
there was typically a conflict between the parent's and the State's
perception of the child's best interest, and the matter was litigated
342. See supra Part I.C.
343. See supra note 145.
344. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Joshua DeShaney was a four-year-old boy who was left profoundly retarded after
several beatings by his father. Social Services had become involved with the family
after Joshua's physician notified them of suspected abuse. See id. at 192. He was
temporarily removed, but returned on the condition that his father comply with the
agency's proffered services. See id. Social Services failed to take action, despite the
fact that while Joshua was under their supervision the caseworker noticed unusual
bruises, the father failed to comply with services and Joshua went to the emergency
room twice with injuries. See id. at 192-93. The Court held that the due process
clause conferred no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may
be necessary to secure a life, liberty or property interest, of which the government
itself may not deprive the individual. See id. at 196.
345. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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focusing on those two positions. Little consideration was given to
whether the parents accurately represented the child's actual best
interest, or merely asserted their own interest. 346 The result is that
the focus on the rights of parents, and parents' interest in the child
versus the State's interest in the child, has left the child powerless
as a rights-bearer. Children's rights are generally thought to be
represented insofar as they align with either the interest of the
State or the interest of the parents.347
The conflicting goals of parents, children and the State are not
well accommodated in criminal court. The child has no advocate in
the criminal court proceedings because victims are never indepen-
dently represented in criminal prosecutions, and the prosecutor is
not obligated to abide by the victim's requests. Without represen-
tation, the court lacks input on what is in the child's best interests
when making a ruling.
In child endangerment cases, the criminal court makes determi-
nations that inevitably affect the custodial status of the child. Be-
cause the child's fundamental rights of due process and liberty are
affected, the question becomes to what extent does the child have a
right to remain with her parent.348 If that right is limited, then per-
346. Pierce and Meyer were decided without reference to the interests of the child,
reinforcing the concept of children as property. In Meyer, the Court's decision that
the state could not forbid the teaching of foreign languages in public schools centered
on the Court's assertion that such a law would infringe upon the liberty rights of
parents and teachers. The child's interest in an education that included foreign lan-
guage instruction was not discussed. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. In Pierce, the Court
similarly limited its discussion to the liberty interests of parents and teachers. See
Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.
347. This development is often blamed on the presumption that parents act in the
best interest of their children. This presumption also has been embraced by advo-
cates for parents and family preservation. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 284, at 399.
"Even in cases involving parental abuse and neglect, the Court has upheld the pre-
sumption that parents act in their children's best interest. In Santovsky v. Kramer,
this presumption was expressed by requiring a heightened standard of evidence to
terminate parental rights." Id. at 412. As deference to parents' rights expands, courts
tend to reject children's claims if they conflict with those of their parents. See, e.g.,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) ("We have never had occasion to
decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in
maintaining her filial relationship. We need not do so here .... "). See also Fitzger-
ald, supra note 298, at 26.
The liberal constitutional view of persons as autonomous individuals and the
popular view of children as anything but autonomous individuals clash irrec-
oncilably. As a result, when deciding constitutional issues involving children
the Supreme Court has inadvertently demonstrated the inadequacy of the
liberal model of personhood for children.
Id.
348. This paper does not advocate raising the child's status to a level equal with
that of adults. In the modern welfare state it is sound policy to acknowledge the
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haps it is acceptable that a child endangerment prosecution disre-
gards family preservation and the child's best interest in pursuit of
retribution and deterrence. The child's best interests may be pe-
ripherally considered when the court or the jury determines if the
State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of en-
dangerment was committed. However, if the child's right to the
parent-child relationship is substantial, then perhaps it dictates that
the only appropriate forum for adjudicating child neglect is one
that is free to consider the child's best interest first and foremost,
as well as strive for family preservation when possible. This consid-
eration is simply not possible within the confines of a criminal pros-
ecution with its own burden of proof and standard for review. If
the child's right to the parent-child relationship is fundamental, it
may demand that the child be represented in any court proceeding
that affects her custodial status. The expansion of the law guard-
ian's role in family court matters exemplifies the importance of
representation for the child.349 However, victims are not indepen-
dently represented in criminal prosecutions.
Ultimately the question is whether the child's right to remain
with her family is so compelling that the forum in which that right
will be best protected is the forum that should be chosen for ne-
glect adjudications. If it is, then clearly neglect belongs in family
court. Such a determination should involve weighing the child's
liberty interest in family autonomy and unity with the state's inter-
est in prosecuting criminally-neglectful parents. The debate
around criminalization then will turn on the constitutional implica-
tions of each policy. The child's liberty interest is protected under
New York Social Services Law, the FCA and federal legislation
that requires that the best interests of the child be the overriding
consideration,3 50 and that family preservation remain a goal where
ever possible.351 In a criminal prosecution, however, such consider-
ations are absent.352 In this way, the criminal prosecution of child
neglect does not adequately represent the status that children have
achieved as rights-bearers. The state can separate a parent and
patriarchal role of the State and family in the lives of children. Instead, this paper
asserts that children have interests independent of the State and their parents and that
protection of these interests requires legal representation and some degree of auton-
omy in decision-making.
349. See supra Part II.B.
350. See supra note 136.
351. See supra notes 155-160.
352. See supra Part I.C.
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child without any attempt to safeguard the parent-child
relationship.
B. Why Criminalization Does Not Adequately Protect the
Rights of Children and Families
The child protection system and the family court should be used
to address the problem of neglect because under the child protec-
tion system, the child's constitutional right to the parent-child rela-
tionship is best considered and protected.
Law enforcement should certainly play a role because child en-
dangerment is a crime. However, social workers should be in-
cluded in criminal investigations of child neglect to make sure that
the child is considered at all stages. Police and caseworkers to-
gether conduct a thorough investigation. Caseworkers often em-
ploy the assistance of police when making home visits or removing
children in order to ensure the safety of everyone involved.353
The problem with criminalization is not that the police are play-
ing a more active role in child welfare. The problem is what hap-
pens after the arrest. The defendant-parent may go through a
criminal prosecution and receive some form of punishment, with-
out receiving any help to change the root of the problem. The ret-
ribution and the punishment that is achieved by a criminal
prosecution may be valuable for society, but it may have little
value to the family itself. The parent ultimately goes back to the
home and the child, still ill-equipped to remedy the neglectful be-
havior that is the root of the problem.
Opponents of criminalization assert that the police are ex-
panding the domestic violence "must arrest" policy to neglect. 354 It
is difficult to determine if this assertion is really the case. The New
York Police Department's position is that they have always re-
sponded to child neglect the way they have in recent years.3 5 5 This
response would indicate that the increased number of arrests is
simply due to a higher rate of neglect. However, the numbers re-
ported by child protection services do not indicate this claim.356
353. See MARC PARENT, TURNING STONES: My DAYS AND NIGHTS WITH CHIL-
DREN AT RISK 146 (1996) (recounting the use of police assistance in removing chil-
dren by the author, a former New York City Emergency Children's Services
caseworker).
354. See supra note 61.
355. See supra note 169.
356. See app. infra, tbl.1 (showing that the number of reports has increased very
little in the last eight years).
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Regardless of the policy behind the arrests, the result is where the
real problem lies.
Family advocates should reject the criminalization of child wel-
fare not because it is a wholly bad option, but because there is a
better option. The child protective system and the FCA promote
family preservation and the child's best interests, and promote so-
ciety's goal for safe and stable families for all children. The crimi-
nal prosecution of child endangerment can achieve separation of
the victim and the offender and punishment of the offender. How-
ever, this outcome is not in the best interests of children and par-
ents because it does not provide for family preservation and
unification.
What, if anything, does criminal prosecution achieve that family
court cannot? In cases of abuse, where the harm to the child is
more immediate, prosecution under the assault statute provides an
immediate remedy. Neglect, however, poses more of a long-term
threat. Whether the neglect is a product of poor parenting skills,
poverty or other ailments, a civil remedy designed to address the
harm that has been done, and prevent harm in the future, may be
more effective in the long-term.
The New York City child protective system may not be perfect,
but it is designed to look out for the best interests of the child and
to preserve families whenever possible.
Essentially, this choice is a policy question: Who is better
equipped to handle the problem of neglect? The answer depends
on what resolution society wants for families in crisis. If family
preservation is to remain a priority, then family court proceedings
are more appropriate. If punishing the crime and preventing fur-
ther offense is more important, then criminal prosecution may be
more appropriate. This Note supports the legislative goals of fam-
ily preservation and child protection as identified in the New York
Social Services Law and the FCA, and for this reason supports the
use of family court proceedings to address child neglect, its causes
and effects.
The child has a recognizable liberty interest in the parent-child
relationship. The exclusion of the child from the criminal prosecu-
tion does not reflect the status that children have achieved as
rights-bearers in that the child has no voice and no right to self-
determination in proceedings that affect custodial status.35 7 Crimi-
nal prosecution creates a chasm in the relationship between the
357. See supra Part II.B.
1098
CRIMINALIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE
parent and child, and there are no provisions that address this
problem. It is not sufficient to presume that the child's interest is
represented by the parent or the State because it is precisely this
presumption that was discarded when the role of the law guardian
was created in the family court system.358
Because the criminal context is centered around a strict two
party system - parent versus the State, the child is left voiceless.
Her rights are presumed protected by either the parent or the
State, although her true interests often do not fully align with
either. The lack of protection for the child's best interest that cur-
rently exists in a criminal prosecution seems to call for a procedural
remedy. One possibility would be for the criminal court judge to
hold an automatic hearing before an order of protection is issued.
Essentially, this goal can be achieved if defense counsel requests
the hearing. However, the standard by which to judge the criminal
charges still will fail to encompass an assessment of what is best for
the child. Thus, the child should be represented by legal counsel in
a child endangerment prosecution and the child's best interests
should be considered before an order of protection is issued. How-
ever, to add the role of a law guardian in child endangerment cases
is implausible because victims generally have no independent rep-
resentation in criminal prosecutions. Such an expansion would set
a precedent of the victim as a party to criminal prosecutions.
While this is not the direction in which the criminal justice system
is likely to move, it would certainly help the criminal prosecution
of child neglect achieve a holistic remedy for families.
Within the constraints of the criminal justice system families are
not treated as a rights-bearing unit. Therefore, the most appropri-
ate forum for neglect adjudication is family court, where the child
is better represented, and the standard is the child's best interests.
CONCLUSION
As child protection comes to the forefront of law-enforcement,
the legislature, judicial scrutiny and the criminal justice system
must reassess the effectiveness of the traditional two-party system
in proceedings that affect the custodial status of non-party children.
Because the child has traditionally been the victim in neglect cases,
the rights of children have been discussed and developed in the
context of asking, what rights does a child have against her parent?
That is, when is corporal punishment excessive, what constitutes
358. See id.
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neglect, to what extent can a parent control the child's education,
medical care and so forth. This discussion, while an important one,
has neglected to encompass the question of what rights does a child
have to be with her parent? Addressing this point requires a bal-
ancing of interests - the State's interest in protecting children, the
parents' interest in raising their children and the child's interest in
both safety and a parent-child relationship.
The trend in child welfare has been to err on the side of protec-
tion, often considered erring on the side of the child. While this
approach may have been appropriate to overcome a long history of
State abstinence from involvement in the family domain, it has
been under-inclusive in protecting the child's fundamental right to
a parent-child relationship. A delicate balance must be struck be-
tween family autonomy and State intervention. This balance is
best achieved in the family court when the child's best interest is
represented and the family is addressed as a whole. Under tradi-
tional criminal procedure, which focuses on the parent-defendant
versus the State, one of these two parties is presumed to represent
the child's best interest. This presumption effectively precludes the
notion that the child may have an interest that is independent of
either the parent or the State. The result has left the child voice-
less, dependent on the judgment of the parent, the State or a court.
This judgment will always be under-informed without input from
the child. This Note concludes that the criminal justice system, by
focusing on the parent's claims against the State and the State's
interest in child protection, is inadequate in accommodating the
constitutional rights of the child to self-determination. Neglect is
more appropriately adjudicated under the FCA, which considers
the best interests of the child first and foremost, and which strives
for family preservation.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTS
FY 1990-1998359
Abuse/Neglect Reports: Total number of all reports recorded by the State Central Register
(SCR), for the Fiscal Year received.
Children: Total of all children in reports
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 360
Abuse/Neglect
Reports 55,158 52,985 52,504 52,458 49,129 47,571 52,994 53,567 57,842




1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total
Mandated 31,970 33,139 32,699 33,927 31,521 30,202 32,858 39,572
Total Non-
Mandated 19,746 19,210 19,728 17,026 15,348 16,356 19,185 16,559
TABLE 3
PERCENT OF INDICATED ABUSE/NEGLECT CASES BY
REPORTING SOURCE
CY 1990_1997362
Indicated Abuse/Neglect Reports: Percent of reports, determined upon
investigation to have credible evidence of abuse or neglect.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total Mandated 50.1% 43.5% 34.4% 33.2% 34.8% 36.0% 40.1% 40.0%
Total Non-
Mandated 26.3% 22.5% 16.7% 16.5% 17.6% 18.1% 16.7% 17.4%
359. For the source of this data, see ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVS.,
OUTCOME AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (June 1998) (deriving data from State
Central Register Monthly Reports).
360. The 1998 figures are projected.
361. For the source of this data, see ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVS.,
OUTCOME AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (June 1998) (deriving data from State
Central Register Monthly Reports).
362. For the source of this data, see id.
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TABLE 4
ARTICLE 10 PETITIONS FILED ANNUALLY
FY 1990-1998363
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 364
Article 10
Petitions
Filed 21,719 16,200 12,837 10,798 9,646 8,554 9,381 11,154 11,000
TABLE 5
STATE OF NEW YORK - DIVISION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVICES
OJSABUREAU OF STATISTICAL SERVICES




ARREST YEAR 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
TOTAL ARRESTS 303 335 419 424 486 644 872 1052 1111
UNREPORTED DISPOSITIONS 26 30 32 27 51 67 80 204 492
% OF ARRESTS 8.6% 9.0% 7.6% 6.4% 9.9% 10.4% 9.2% 19.4% 44.3%
NOT PROSECUTED 17 14 42 29 51 63 59 66 71
PROSECUTED 260 291 345 368 387 514 733 782 548
CONVICTED 108 120 142 172 192 195 308 272 283
-PLEA 105 117 134 171 192 189 299 271 282
-VERDICT 1 1 5 0 0 4 6 0 1
-UNKNOWN 2 2 3 1 0 2 3 1 0
DISMISSED 148 167 197 187 187 310 420 498 250
ACQUITI'ED 1 0 3 5 4 1 1 3 1
OTHER DISPOSITION 3 4 3 4 4 8 4 9 14
SENTENCES TO:
PRISON 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 2
JAIL 9 11 26 14 21 19 31 28 26
TIME SERVED 17 6 7 7 6 9 9 7 14
JAIL + PROBATION 1 0 3 0 4 3 9 8 8
PROBATION 12 17 12 27 21 16 30 29 13
FINE 11 5 17 7 10 15 20 20 20
COND. DISCHARGE 55 78 73 116 127 126 202 171 189
OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1
UNKNOWN 2 2 3 1 2 6 4 5 10
363. See id.
364. The 1998 figures are projected.
365. For the source of this date, see COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORY (Jan.
1999).









39.0% 39.3% 36.7% 43.3% 43.8% 33.8% 38.9% 32.1% 45.7%
25.9% 15.0% 26.1% 12.2% 16.7% 16.4% 16.2% 16.5% 17.7%
0.9% 0.8% 3.5% 1.2% 0.5% 1.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7%
32.4% 35.0% 37.3% 38.4% 35.9% 42.6% 33.1% 44.5% 33.9%
66.7% 64.2% 59.2% 60.5% 63.5% 56.4% 66.2% 54.8% 65.4%
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